Rare Interview with Israel Navy SEAL Commander

Translation of the Hebrew-language article by Yossi Yehoshua and Reuven Vice, published in Ynet’s (Yediot Ahronot’s) 7 Days magazine on September 20, 2024

After 11 months of fierce battles by naval commandos, the commander of the flotilla, Col. A., speaks in his first interview about the sad rescue of the bodies of the abductees from the tunnel, his great dilemma on the bloody Saturday, the combined fighting at sea and in the underground arena - and the target that never leaves his head: Yahya Sinwar. "You have to respect Hamas' fighting capability, it's an organized and orderly enemy. We are shaping reality for years to come."

The feeling felt by every Israeli who saw the horrifying video from the tunnel, in which the six abductees were held in inhumane conditions, was felt intensely by Col. A., the commander of Shayetet 13, who has seen quite a bit in his 22 years as a fighter. He was there, in the Tel es Sultan Refugee Camp in Rafah, and will never forget that day.

Very thin and neglected, with signs of previous injuries and signs of gunfire a day earlier that ended their lives. This, according to an IDF report provided to their families, was how the bodies of the six hostages rescued from the Hamas death tunnel were found: Hersh Goldberg-Polin, Carmel Gat, Eden Yerushalmi, Alex Lobanov, Almog Sarusi and Ori Danino.

A video released last week by IDF Spokesperson Brig. Gen. Daniel Hagari shows the horrific and heartbreaking conditions in which the hostages were held: unbearable heat, almost no air, with cesspits and urine bottles, and unable to stand upright. Kalashnikov bullet casings and large blood stains were horrific evidence of the brutal murder.

Colonel A (40), commander of Shayetet 13, who was on the scene together with the 401st Brigade Commander and senior officers in the Yahalom unit, describes that terrible day as "an unbearable feeling. One of the hardest moments I've ever experienced. I felt this feeling only when fighters fell, and at this moment. We are fighting against the face of evil, no less."

Tough officer, Col. A. Throughout his years of service, he participated in countless operations, the vast majority of which will never be allowed to be published. But he, too, struggles, and almost falls silent, trying to describe that terrible moment when the bodies were discovered. "Hard. It's very hard," he bites his lip.

Two days before, the feeling was different. In an operation in a nearby tunnel, the forces located Farhan al-Qadi alive and rescued him from the tunnel. "A moment of elation," Col. A. recalled. "Suddenly you feel the whole significance of the extraordinary achievement of bringing a kidnapped person alive. But this is a brief moment. An hour after he was rescued and evacuated, we were already fighting on the ground. Even after such a happy moment, the war continues. There's no Hollywood ending."

This is his first interview with the media. "It's not natural to me," he admits, as someone who over the past 22 years has become accustomed to acting in the shadows, as a man of silence. "But I think that such an interview has value for the public, for the fighters and commanders in Shayetet-13, and for the maneuvering forces that have been working with us shoulder to shoulder for 11 months." This joint maneuver is used, among other things, to bring the hostages to Israel.

When you arrived at Tel a-Sultan, did you know there would be Hostages there? "We went there with the understanding that this was the last stronghold of Hamas that had not yet been systematically dismantled. We understand that there is potential for hostages, but we do not have a one-value focus. Therefore, we operated there using techniques and exercises of gradual and surgical progress, which on the one hand would not endanger the POWs (POWs and MIAs) but would be able to defeat the Tel a-Sultan Battalion. That's how we advanced along the subterranean, until we reached Farhan. We were there, Shayetet 13, Yahalom, the Shin Bet."

In what condition did you find him?" He looks like he's been through a complicated and challenging time. He was quite shocked by the situation. Express a lot of thanks and appreciation. It's hard to describe how we felt at that moment. Even after we rescued him from the tunnel and held him outside, we were still very alert and afraid. It's a threatened space that you still don't fully control. The whole encounter with him, it was an almost imaginary situation. You recognize a character, from afar, of course we didn't know he was there. And that's actually the peak of operational complexity, because it's a complex space, in the heart of a refugee camp, underground, you know there's an enemy presence there, there's a danger of IEDs and booby-traps. This is not a natural place for action. In the midst of this chaos, you have to create something different, with thinking, guidance, stopping, verifying who it is and recognizing that it's one of the hostages.

Did you have any encounters there, underground? "We had encounters underground, but not in the Farhan rescue event. Fighting underground is very complex, because it is a space in which the enemy is prepared against you. Unlike above ground, here you cannot do preparatory activities, like block hinges for example. Your senses are also limited. It's hard to see what's next, sometimes it's also hard to hear. You're actually channeled into the enemy's combat zone, and you don't know how to analyze that area and prepare for it – because you don't know it. It's a bit like fighting fortifications, in a trench, with one going forward and the rest of the force behind him, without seeing what's next. This requires the development of appropriate combat techniques. The Yahalom unit is leading this. The IDF is looking at this whole issue of underground warfare very seriously right now."

In addition to rescuing al-Qadi and locating the bodies of the six hostages who were murdered in the tunnel, the commandos were also involved in the rescue of the abductees, Fernando Merman and Luis Har. "It was a Yamam operation, and us, under the 7th Brigade, were there as envelope forces to get them out to the point of evacuation. In the Yamam operation, we, under the Paratroopers Brigade, were the rescue force. In the first ceasefire, we were also partners in the return of the bodies of Ofir Sarfati and David Tahar."

Col. A assumed command of Shayetet 13 in July 2023, just three months before October 7. "The role of my life," he defines it. "That's what I thought when I took office, and certainly now, after the past year."

He grew up in the unit as a combat soldier and then as an officer, among other things as deputy commander of Shayetet 13's combat platoon: "a lot of unique activity that does not rise above the threshold of secrecy and about which it is impossible to elaborate", and after three years of studies at Tel Aviv University, he was appointed commander of Shayetet 13's combat platoon. "A lot of operational activity, especially in the second half of the job, with the beginning of the naval campaign of the campaign between the wars," he describes. "This role is the ultimate fulfillment of a warrior-commander."

Col. A spent the next three and a half years in a senior staff position in the Kirya (IDF Headquarters).

What did you discover in this role that you didn't know from Shayetet 13? "It's a whole different dimension. I discovered the weight of the responsibility that the Chief of the General Staff has, the IDF's responsibility for the national security of the state, in a broad sense. The workspaces, the partners, the full capabilities. It's a completely different perspective from that of the commander or fighter in the field."

And after October 7, after you've been in this role for three and a half years, there's no sense of "how did we not see this coming?" On October 7, we failed. I, too, as a senior commander, am part of it. Now it's just learning and trying to get better. Buy more equipment, buy new weapons. Learn to do everything so that it doesn't happen again. Since then, we have two main obligations: to meet the goals of the war, and to ensure the security of Israel civilians."

Alongside the return of the hostages, the goal of the war is also the toppling of Hamas. For that, Sinwar must be eliminated. "I dream of bringing him, and I believe we will bring him. Just like we reached all the other senior officials, I hope we will reach him as well."

***

On October 7, Col. A. was vacationing with his family in Moshav Yaara in the Western Galilee. "October 7 caught us by surprise," he admits. "We were on holiday vacation, and the regular alert forces were at the Shayetet base in Atlit. At 6:30 A.M., when the phone raids began, we made a quick phone assessment, and without anyone telling us at all, our understanding was: “A war has begun.” We immediately gave the order that all forces arrive at the base. My lieutenant picked me up at the base and already along the way we started organizing the transport of our forces to the south – the Air Force's 124th Helicopter Squadron, and for naval forces to collect fighters. At 8:45 A.M., we ordered all the unit's reservists to be bounced. We doubled the unit's manpower. Everyone immediately understood the situation. There was a company commander in the reserves who, at 9:00 A.M., together with his crew members, all reservists, was just at Ben Gurion Airport, on his way to board a plane for a joint vacation abroad, when the order was received. They immediately turned around and left Ben Gurion Airport. By 2:00 P.M., they were already on the helicopter to Be’eri. From zero to a hundred. The reservists were the guiding light of the regular forces."

During those hours, the chaos in the IDF was overwhelming. Almost no one knew to his right and left. The invasion of thousands of Hamas terrorists caught the senior command shocked and unprepared for such a situation.

"Alongside the challenge that clearly existed in the south, there was also concern at that moment that it would happen simultaneously in the north," explains Col. A'. "We also had to prepare for the possibility of immediate fighting there. At the same time, we sent two naval task forces south – one that will reach the center of the Gaza Strip by sea, and the other as a defense force at sea to prevent attempts to penetrate from the sea. We also sent four ground forces in helicopters to help fight the communities. Each such force consisted of 30-50 fighters, commanded by a company commander with the rank of lieutenant colonel."

How do you know where to send them? "Neither I nor any of the forces that left knew what the mission was. Land, see what's happening, and then update and update on WhatsApp. Our forces reached the Sufa outpost, Be’eri, Kfar Aza, Mefalsim and Nir Oz. At the Sufa outpost, our team fought hand-to-hand combat. They joined forces with Or Ben Yehuda, commander of the Caracal battalion, and together with her rescued captives and captured terrorists. The force that reached Be’eri also engaged in significant fighting. In Kfar Aza and Mefalsim, the force joined the commando brigade and operated under the commando brigade commander. Unfortunately, the force arrived after the terrorists left. There they mainly helped those who remained. In Sufa and in Be’eri, the forces stayed for a few days."

And you also immediately went south? Col. A.'s face curls. "It was a very big dilemma," he says. "To this day I struggle with this, where I should have been. I stayed here at the base – I prepared labor forces for the descent south and organized forces for readiness for the north. In terms of management and control, in such a decentralized situation, when nothing is clear in terms of the situation, I think it was the right thing to do. But there is always this tension, between the warrior in you who wants to be in combat, and the commander who is responsible for ensuring optimal functioning. I can guarantee that this changed when the maneuver began."

He's been there ever since, in Gaza. Almost all the time. Barely getting home. "My wife is the real heroine," he says. "She and the children are the source of strength. She tells me: 'Do what needs to be done – win. Meet all your tasks.'"

"After the first days of fighting after October 7, we returned to the base and began preliminary debriefings and preparations for the invasion," he said. "Until the beginning of the invasion, there was leeway for special forces. Stabilize the line in preparation for the invasion, initiate actions that will make it easier, so that it will start well. On the eve of the beginning of the maneuver, for example, we carried out a raid on a Hamas post along the coastline, in the southern sector. An assault raid, with fire from the air and from the ground, which led to damage and destruction of the outpost. This is already the creation of a consciousness of action. It has great value militarily, professionally, morally. Until the invasion, we were constantly thinking about the best way to contribute and influence, whether in our unique actions, as a unit, or shoulder to shoulder, with the ground invasion. We decided that the combination was the right way. We created task forces consisting of a special force and a maneuvering force, from the 162nd, 36th and then 98th Divisions. I spoke with Itzik Cohen (Brigadier General, commander of the 162nd Division) about the right way to integrate this. We decided that in complex objectives, operationally or in terms of international sensitivity, such integrated teams should operate. That's what happened at our entrance to the Qatari hospital."

Why did you enter the hospital?" We had a real indication that terrorists were deployed inside the hospital. Forces of the 401st (Armored) Brigade and Givati came under fire from there. On the other hand, in terms of international legitimacy, it is a sensitive focus within which to operate. We assembled a special task force from the 401st, Shayetet 13, Yahalom, Sayeret Matkal, and other special forces, in order to enter the hospital surgically and find indications of enemy presence. We created a stopper of tanks and armored vehicles that isolated the compound we wanted to enter, went inside, quickly searched and checked, and then cut off contact."

Did you locate terrorists there?" We discovered that there was indeed an enemy presence there, we collected evidence of it, but not as we thought. It was a partial success, but the beginning of our close cooperation with the 162nd Division and the 401st Brigade.

Another operation was the takeover of the Gaza Port, the largest port in the Gaza Strip where Hamas naval forces were staying. "Over the years, we had various plans in the Shayetet to take over the Port if necessary, but I never thought we would conquer it by land," he laughs. "Our force joined the 188th (armored) brigade and we occupied the Port at night."

Another internationally sensitive focal point where the flotilla operatives operated was Al-Rantisi Hospital in the northern Gaza Strip, in Gaza City. "We understood that it was a command-and-control center, weapons and the stay of terrorists," he describes. "The decision to raid there was made at noon, and the raid was carried out that very night. The fighting for Al-Rantisi was one of the most significant operations in the invasion. We discovered clear incrimination there – explosive belts, a large quantity of weapons, clues and evidence that there may have been hostages there, as well as underground spaces near the hospital. This was the beginning of activity in the underground system in this area.

Despite all the complex ground and underground activity in the maneuver, throughout the entire period Shayetet 13 operates simultaneously in the maritime space, both off the coast of the Gaza Strip and in special and covert operations in other sectors and on other days.

Who conducts such operations when the commander of Shayetet 13 fights inside the Gaza Strip? "There is a deputy commander of Shayetet 13, there is a company of fighters, and of course there is the operational headquarters of the navy. It works exemplary. Off the coast of the Gaza Strip, for example, we provide fire support, terrorist attacks, attacks on weapons caches from the sea. There was a case of a team maneuvering on land and encountering an ambush on the coastal road in the Gaza Strip. The warriors on the ground asked for support fire and received it from the warriors at sea."

In the operation at Shifa Hospital in Gaza, the main hospital in the Gaza Strip, Shayetet 13 headed by Col. A. also played a central role. "It was an operational-subterfuge idea, which was translated into a divisional special operation," Col. A explained. "In the discussion leading up to the operation, a dialogue developed, in which each of the forces involved pulled in its own direction. It was like yin and yang—two opposites that together form a whole. This operation was based on Shin Bet, Division, and Southern Command intelligence, and based on all this, we created a plan that surprised the enemy. There was a very strong intelligence infrastructure there. The break-in was led by the Shayetet and Sayeret Nahal, we built an armored combat team and within 15-20 minutes we were inside. We came from a place that the enemy did not think we would come from. We arrested hundreds of terrorists there, more than 500. We thwarted anyone who tried to fight, at all levels, including Raed Thabet, a senior Hamas figure. We had in the compound a combined task force of Duvdevan, Yahalom, Modi'in, Sayeret Matkal, Shin Bet, 504. Each time a different unit operated at the front, according to its relative advantage. The division commander arrived there, including the Commander in Chief and the Chief of the General Staff.

× × ×

On the morning of October 7, one of the main problems for Shayetet was the problem of getting to the south. The Shayetet's base is located in Atlit, and Col. A., along with the entire navy, was forced to operate and organize helicopters and ships to take the fighters to the Gaza Envelope area. The reservists, who were called up immediately in the morning, arrived in mass at the base, equipped themselves, and within a few hours were on the ground. Briefings and updates were quickly given to them by helicopter on the way, and the landing was already straight into battle.

Navy fighters, including the Shayetet, were also the ones who stopped and destroyed the waves of terrorists who tried to continue coming from the sea, after the first wave broke out. For three days, without break or rest, the fighters prevented Hamas terrorists from reaching the sea again. According to IDF figures, during the 11 months of fighting, the navy sailed an average of three years of maritime operations and fired an average of three years' worth of munitions.

The Shayetet investigates what is happening while fighting and learns lessons that have already led to change, especially among the combat detachment – for example, in terms of combat methods and operation underground. Later on, these things will also be included in the training course of the next fighters.

There were quite a few units that, due to manpower shortages, shortened their training and brought fighters into the Gaza Strip faster. Did you do that too? "There were fighters in training who we put in the Shifa combat compound so that they would 'taste' war," says Col. A., "but at the same time we had to maintain the balance. Alongside the immediate need for combat fighters, I must remain faithful to the training to our required capabilities. Whatever I give up and don't prepare for today, we will pay the price for years to come. That's why we didn't disrupt the training."

Officially, Shayetet 13 lost two of its fighters in the war. Lieutenant Colonel Eli Ginsberg (42), who was on leave before his release and immediately jumped into fighting in Be’eri; and Sgt. Ofek Russo (21), a soldier and medic in Shayetet, who on October 7 was on standby at the Shayetet base in Atlit, and was assigned with the alert team and reservists to the battles in Be’eri.

"Eli grew up as a fighter and commander in the flotilla," says Col. A'. "In his last position in the IDF, he was commander of the Counterterrorism School. A few weeks before October 7, the unit held a farewell event for him, ahead of his release. Eli and the company commander of the force that fought in Be’eri are members of the same team from their training. Eli, who was already on leave before his release, joined him there, and there he fell."

According to Col. A., as far as he was concerned, the Shayetet have lost five of its fighters. "In addition to Eli and Ofek," he says, "Amit Waks (48), a reserve soldier of Shayetet 13, who was part of Netiv Ha'Asara's first response squad, also fell. His brother, Yigal (53), also fell in battle for the community. ISA member Yossi Tahar (39), who fell on October 7 in battle at Mefalsim, was a soldier and officer in the flotilla, and Sergeant (res.) Yosef Avner Doran (26) also served as a designated reconnaissance soldier in the flotilla. He fought in the reserves as part of the operational mobility unit and fell in December in the northern Gaza Strip."

***

Col. A. was born in the United States while his parents were there on a security mission, and when he was five years old, the family returned to Israel. He grew up in Rosh HaAyin and completed his high school studies at a school in Tel Aviv, with a realistic orientation. "Most of my classmates went to 8200 or ICT. I did the special forces selection and was sorted into Shayetet, but initially started in pilot’s training course. I was there for more than a year. This was the first class that added academia in the pilot course, in which they graduate with a bachelor's degree, as it is today."

Before enlisting, he actually thought about a different career. "I played professional basketball, reached the seniors, and then I chose to enlist in meaningful service. I thought I'd go back to basketball later. The person standing before my eyes was Barak Peleg, who served as a soldier in the Sayeret Matkal and then returned to play for Hapoel Galilee Elion."

He was dismissed from pilot training after a little more than a year. "I didn't want to be a pilot, but I did want to succeed. I had a hard time with being ousted," he admits, "the first time I experienced failure. It definitely built me up for later on."

Following the same interview he did for the Shayetet, he came to the selection for the unit, and after receiving the necessary recommendations, he began the combat course in the unit in March 2003, and later went on to an officers' course. In August 2006 he became a team commander of a team in training, a position he held for two and a half years and in which he also lost one of his fighters on the track, Staff Sergeant David Elhanan Rubin (21) z"l, who was murdered in December 2007 in an attack alongside his friend, Corporal Ahikam Amichai (20), while hiking in Wadi Talam. "I became very attached to Rubin's family," Col. A. describes. "His father, Rabbi Mishael, was the one who married Roni and I." We’ve been together since 12th grade. They are the parents of two daughters and a son (13, 10, 7).

During his service in the IDF, Col. A left the Navy for a job with the Army. "I moved to the position of Company Commander of a battalion in the Nahal. I was a Company Commander for a year in advanced training at the Nahal Hospital, and then a Company Commander in Kissufim and the Harsina Outpost in Hebron. I gained experiences there that shaped me a lot later in my service." In 2010 he returned to the Shayetet, this time as Commander of the Raiders Unit, for two years of very significant clandestine activity. Among other things, during this period he was one of the leaders in the takeover of the German arms ship Victoria, which transported weapons from Syria to the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip.

"A. is a unique officer, without exaggeration - he is one of the best I have ever met," says a very senior officer in the defense establishment, under whom Col. A served before assuming the position of commander of Shayetet 13. "He is in the category of someone you wanted to be like: mature, with one of the highest levels of analysis in the General Staff, moral, modest, businesslike, courageous and sharp-minded. He will always say his true opinion and not 'what needs to be heard'. To me, it is chief-of-staff material."

In the meantime, Col. A continues to lead the commandos in the Gaza Strip and fight shoulder to shoulder alongside them and the maneuvering ground forces. Contempt for Hamas is not part of its work plan.

This is an enemy whose fighting capability we must respect. They have very significant weapons, combat techniques that have been prepared. They are not barefoot. It is an organized and orderly enemy. But we are stronger than them and more capable. We continue to break down their capabilities. In every battle, despite the harsh costs, we have the upper hand. We dismantle and win there in every encounter, and shape reality for years to come."

But it seems to be taking too long. "This theater of war is the most complex I have ever met. I also didn't learn about such an arena. What crazy complexes there are. A mighty underground system. Something very significant was built there. And while fighting, we need to address this challenge, while learning and adapting. It is true that there are difficult moments, doubts and thoughts, but there are also moments of mental fortitude. For example, when I look the sub-commanders and fighters in the eye and they ask me for more missions, they want to move forward. This generation is a phenomenal generation. Professional, mentally strong, with learning ability. It is not easy to maintain such mental strength after 11 consecutive months of fighting. And I think it's because of the power they have behind them, – the home, the parents, the spouses, the children. That's a lot because of them."

"My translation of 'Together We Will Win' is the joint action," he says. "In my small world, in the simple and military sense, 'together we will win' means building the best team from all forces and units, and with it defeating the enemy. I see this as a great personal and national challenge. This is our shift, and we have no other choice. We must fulfill this obligation."