History of Shayetet 13, Israel’s Navy SEALs

1940-1949: Palmach Naval Sabotage Units – Mission

The establishment of a Jewish naval force began in the late 1930s, in parallel to the formation of a Jewish defense force in Mandate Palestine. The naval force that emerged was assigned two main roles: naval warfare and supporting immigration movement activities. Initially, during World War II, the force operated under British influence and with their assistance, as part of the defense forces for the emerging Jewish state. Later, when the British limited Jewish immigration, the naval force began to act against them. In 1948, during the War of Independence, the naval force operated in ports in Europe and the Mediterranean Sea, mainly against Egyptian ships and vessels carrying weapons destined for the Arab armies. The units that operated in the 1940s laid the foundation for the establishment of Flotilla 13.

Formation of the naval sabotage units

The first naval sabotage operation by Haganah fighters was documented in 1939, against the British police vessel Sinbad 2. The first Haganah naval course also began that year, and some of its graduates were sent to assist the British army near Greece. In the winter of 1941, a special course on landing and sabotage was initiated for sea and land fighters. The course was led by the British in the Yarkon River area and lasted for several months.

Palyam naval sabotage unit

On May 15, 1941, the Haganah (Jewish defense forces) established strike companies, called “Palmach,” and sent them an operation along the coast of Lebanon. On May 18, a special force was sent to sabotage the refineries in Tripoli, Lebanon, to prevent the Germans from refueling at the Syrian airfields. The force consisted of twenty-three Palmach fighters, graduates of the landing and sabotage course. Some were from the Palmach’s Nodedet (Roaming) unit, with others were from night companies and special operations combatants. The fighters known as “the 23 seamen” set out on the Sea Lion, a large government motorboat, but it disappeared. Its whereabouts have remained unknown to this very day. Another joint operation with British forces took place in June 1941. This was a reconnaissance and sabotage mission as part of the Australian army's invasion of Lebanon and Syria, in which units from the first Palmach recruits participated.

In January 1943, the first naval division was established within the Palmach. As part of their training, the division operated off the coast of Caesarea, near Kibbutz Sdot Yam. They were trained as boat commanders and also learned naval sabotage skills. In early 1944, the naval division was incorporated into the Palmach special units company (Z Company).

As World War II drew to a close, the Palmach general staff decided to expand the naval unit in response to the urgent needs of the immigration movement. In April 1945, the naval personnel were separated from Z Company, their numbers increased, and they were organized into a new platoon that operated in Caesarea, Y Company, known as Palyam (Palmach’s naval arm). The company was assigned to the Fourth Battalion, the Palmach's headquarters battalion, and was given four main tasks: immigration operations, naval transport, landing infantry units on enemy shores, and naval sabotage to damage enemy vessels and coastal facilities.

In late 1945, the Palmach command decided to regularize naval sabotage activities, and established the naval sabotage unit as part of the Palyam. Located at the Palyam base, the unit initially consisted of just eight fighters. This number grew to a peak of twenty-four until it was disbanded at the end of 1947. The unit's goal was to disrupt the British Navy's efforts to prevent Jewish immigration to Palestine, then illegal under Mandate law, by targeting British patrol and deportation ships and conducting raids and sabotage operations from the sea along the coast. For these purposes, the unit used rowboats and fishing boats borrowed from nearby kibbutzim.

During its two years of activity, this unit carried out successful sabotage operations against the British. In the main method of operation, the fighters descended from a boat, swam stealthily to the target, attached delayed-action mines, and retreated back to the boat. The unit made it difficult for the British to deport Jews by sabotaging ships while in port, forcing the British to invest significant resources in protecting both ports and ships. Starting in April 1947, to increase the element of surprise, the unit intensified its efforts and expanded its operations to foreign ports where British patrol and deportation ships were anchored. While continuing to target ships in local ports in Palestine, they successfully sabotaged ships in ports in Cyprus and Germany.

Operating with a strong commitment to the mission, the unit was able to identify the target’s weaknesses and conduct surprise attacks. With each operation, the unit members learned from their mistakes the hard way. They learned lessons and improved their methods. The main conclusion was that they could cause significant damage to a target, even a major power, with only a few fighters, limited equipment, and no experience, without any casualties. The aim was to fluster the British without harming their strength, and in this, the naval sabotage unit succeeded. Later, Yosef “Yossele” Dror, one of the founders of Israel's naval force, wrote that the considerations of a naval sabotage unit commander, with one or two fighters under his command, equaled those of a battalion or brigade commander.

The War of Independence

The War of Independence broke out on November 30, 1947. During this time, the improvised naval forces operated using a range of tactics and targeted distant objectives. The war effort focused on striking Arab countries and attempting to acquire weaponry that would alter the balance of power in the region. Additionally, new units were established, modeled after the Italian Navy's Decima Flottiglia MAS (“10th Assault Vehicle Flotilla”). The establishment of these units involved the weapons supply, learning combat tactics, and training. These formed the basis for the creation of Flotilla 13 and continue to influence it to this day.

After the naval sabotage unit was disbanded, some of its fighters joined the Palyam naval division at Haifa port, and in late December 1947, they established the Haifa Port Company. This company mainly defended the port and carried out sabotage operations against the Arab Najada command and Arab targets in Haifa. In addition, the company participated in the Battle of Haifa in April 1948, and Operation Ben-Ami to capture Western Galilee and Acre in May 1948. After the company assisted in the operation to blow up the Litani Bridge under the Carmeli Brigade, it was disbanded, and its members were dispersed to units fighting in other areas.

In late 1946, efforts were made to prepare a homemade torpedo called Shark. This torpedo was never used for its intended purpose against the British Navy, and in 1948, this unit also became a naval sabotage unit until it was disbanded.

Another unit, established by graduates of the naval sabotage unit, was the European sabotage unit. This unit operated under the Haganah’s Fourth Brigade and in collaboration with the Mossad LeAliyah Bet, to aid the immigration of the remaining refugees from Europe and to identify sabotage targets. Initially, they looked for targets in France, and when none were found, they moved to Italy.

In April 1948, Operation Shalal (Booty) sunk the Lino, which was carrying a large quantity of weapons destined for Arab countries, in the port of Bari, Italy. Following the operation, in May 1948, the Haganah command decided to officially establish the naval sabotage unit.

In July 1948, as a continuation of the European sabotage unit's activities, a group of fighters who were graduates of the naval sabotage unit established the Divers Unit. This unit was also called the Naval Sabotage Unit or the “Suicide Unit.” It engaged in small-scale warfare as part of landing operations. Initially, the unit was stationed in Jaffa, where it began its training. Later its base was moved to Caesarea. During operations and tours in Italy, the members of the Submarine Unit met an Italian demolition expert with extensive operational experience in sinking ships. This individual helped train them in diving and infiltration.

With the extensive knowledge they accumulated, unit members engaged in training in swimming, diving, and quiet approach to coastal targets, as well as camouflage and sabotage. The unit trained divers in several stages, and by the end of the war, it had about thirty divers. In November 1948, the Submarine Unit led Operation David in the port of Beirut, Lebanon, sinking the Igris, which was designated for conversion into an Egyptian warship. In December 1948, as part of Operation Horev, which aimed to push the Egyptian army out of the Negev, a naval landing battalion was deployed while still in the process of establishment. The battalion’s mission was to strike the railway line connecting Rafah and Al-Arish. The force included ten saboteurs from the Submarine Unit. The operation was successful, but its results were not significant, as the damage was small and quickly repaired. Another attempt was made on January 2, 1949, as part of Operation Oz (Might). The unit operated using the same method but encountered the enemy and retreated. Lessons were learned from these operations, which the unit later implemented.

The Explosive Boats Unit was established as part of the continued efforts to upgrade naval capabilities. In February 1948, Haganah representatives discovered a shipyard in Milan, Italy, that during World War II had built torpedo boats for the Italian Navy's Decima Flottiglia MAS. These were fast boats that carried a 300 kg explosive charge in their bow. The Haganah signed a deal to purchase six unusable boats that would be refurbished. In June 1948, the boats were sent to the nascent Jewish state. Accompanying them was an Italian instructor, a commando from the 10th Flotilla, whose role was to train the combat teams. With the arrival of the boats, called "rescue boats" to disguise their true purpose, the Boats Unit was established at Jaffa port with twelve commandos. These boats were also called Yochai Boats after Yochai Ben-Nun (founder of Flotilla 13, sixth commander of the Israeli Navy), or Strike Boats. The initial training exercises for this unit were held on the Sea of Galilee. In contrast to the Italian battle methodology, the unit added a collection boat equipped with an infrared lens, to enable sailors to locate a person in the water and rescue him.

On the evening of October 22, 1948, the war’s second truce, four Israeli boats set out, with twelve fighters from the special forces unit on board. Their mission was to locate and destroy the Egyptian navy's flagship, Al-Amir Farouk, which was on its way to the coast of Gaza to reinforce Egyptian forces fighting on the southern front. With the help of two torpedo boats, they attacked and hit the warship and the accompanying minesweeper. This operation had significant consequences for the entire campaign, particularly for the naval campaign, and the date was designated Israeli Navy Day.

During this decade, the Haganah formed the professional and operational infrastructure for small-scale naval warfare, aimed at attacking vessels and ports, landing forces on the coast, and preventing the transfer of weapons to the enemy. All units demonstrated naval commando capabilities in swimming, diving, and using torpedo boats. They assisted Haganah headquarters, and later the navy, in fulfilling their missions and deterring the enemy by attacking its symbols. In parallel, they learned new skills and grew stronger, at first while collaborating with the British army, and later with the Italian Navy's Decima Flottiglia MAS. 

1950-1960: Founding Years – Initiative and Attack

This decade marks the first steps in the journey of Flotilla 13, starting with its establishment in 1950. Its founding commanders envisioned a strong operational unit that would respond to Israel’s challenges in the maritime field, both close to Israel's borders and far beyond. During this period, Flotilla 13 began to formulate its fighting spirit, basic principles of combat, and traditions. It also participated in Operation Kadesh.

The founding of Flotilla 13

In late 1949, the commander of the Boats Unit, Yochai Ben-Nun, and the commander of the Divers Unit, Yossele Dror, initiated the merger of the two units, which until then had operated in parallel but independently. They hoped that the unification would bring the unit appropriate resources. Their primary goal was access to suitable recruits. They organized the merger and recruited volunteers for the unit. In the first naval commando course in October 1949, eighteen participants successfully completed their training.

After the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the Haganah was absorbed into the Israel Defense Forces. The IDF made the decision to establish Flotilla 13 on January 1, 1950, and gave the official order for its establishment on February 8, 1950, as a naval sabotage unit, one of four naval commando units in the Israeli Navy. Flotilla 13 united the naval sabotage units that had formed under the Haganah. Initially, Flotilla 13 operated out of Jaffa Port, while later it moved to Atlit, where it remains to this day. It operated using small vessels, with the support of Navy and Air Force units.

Flotilla 13’s purpose was to damage the enemy's naval power at its sea bases, through extensive use of sabotage, assault tactics, intelligence superiority, initiative, and personal sense of mission. The Flotilla was modeled on the Palmach fighting spirit, and its commanders worked to establish it as a special military unit. The organizational model, knowledge, and training were based on the Italian Navy's Decima Flottiglia MAS. The unit was divided into four specialized subunits, each focusing on different special operations at sea: a diver unit, a unit specializing in the use of Maiale "Pigs" (human torpedoes or diver propulsion vehicle), an explosive boats unit, and the INS (Israel Navy Ship) Noga.

To strengthen the unit's capabilities in raids and sabotage operations, it had to enhance its ground combat skills, small-unit command abilities, and field intelligence and recon. Therefore, its commanders began to participate in IDF command courses – the commandos in the squad commanders' course, and the officers in the ground forces officers' course. Field intelligence gathering also became a focus, with Unit B-10 engaging in intelligence gathering in addition to its expertise in explosive boats. During this period, the unit's training was conducted on Israel’s coastline, but its fighters also sailed aboard the INF Noga to islands in the Mediterranean Sea, conducting raids on them for training purposes.

Beginning in 1954, trainees in the initial phase joined the unit's 14-kilometer Haifa-Acre swim, which mostly took place during the Sukkot holiday. In addition, the four-day march to Jerusalem became part of the training. The unit continued to send fighters to the infantry officers' course and sent senior commanders to the ground forces battalion commanders' course. As a result, the senior leadership decided to prepare a company commanders' course and send young officers to the Navy's sea captains’ course. That year, the leadership also decided that all trainees would complete a parachuting course, and that the benchmark for acceptance to the unit would be a foot march from Rosh Hanikra to Ashkelon.

Flotilla 13 began cooperating with the French naval commandos starting in 1955. Several officers went to France for joint training and acquired knowledge in training and operational methods. They also learned about advanced combat equipment used by the French, including rubber boats (instead of Israel’s wooden boats and kayaks), and diving equipment. The joint exercises took place in submarines, and they also trained together in port infiltration and sea-to-shore raids.

In addition to the professional training required for diving and operating boats, Flotilla trainees worked on improving their physical fitness, particularly focusing on swimming, including long-distance swimming in various sea conditions and in all seasons. During the first months of training, new recruits learned about weapons and boats. After completing the second phase, they joined the IDF's squad commander course at Joara base near Kibbutz Ein HaShofet, where they practiced infantry combat and parachuting.

In these formative years of Flotilla 13, its members shaped the unit’s combat doctrine, based on missions such as reconnaissance in enemy ports and along their coastlines, observations, and above-water and underwater raids on enemy ships and facilities. In this decade, the understanding emerged that they must patrol and dive in enemy ports, developing their professional and operational level in preparation for callup. They must constantly search for the enemy's weak points, so that when the fighting broke out, they would be ready to deliver a decisive blow.

From early 1954 until Operation Kadesh in October 1956, Flotilla 13 carried out numerous intelligence-gathering missions in preparation for sabotage operations on vessels in enemy ports, mainly in the Red Sea, along the coasts of Sinai and Saudi Arabia, but also in the Mediterranean, along the coasts of Lebanon and Egypt. The operations included covert combat methods at sea and on land, using rubber boats and swimming. Flotilla 13 also cooperated with the Israel Air Force, using Piper aircraft for extracting forces or parachuting fighters into the field. In addition, the unit undertook many actions to test a combined landing operation on the Sinai coast in preparation for a military operation. These missions significantly increased the fighters’ combat capabilities, confidence, and morale, aside from the vast intelligence information gathered and technical and operational lessons learned.

Operation Kadesh

The Sinai campaign, known as Operation Kadesh, was the most comprehensive military operation conducted by the IDF since the establishment of the state. The operation aimed to stop the disruption of Israel's freedom of navigation and the infiltration of fedayeen terror attacks from Egypt and Jordan into Israel, which began after the War of Independence. On the eve of the operation, Flotilla 13 had only a few dozen fighters, so after the war began, about forty reserve fighters were mobilized. Advance preparation included reconnoitering enemy ports and coasts and operation plans. But the unit had never actually carried out a combat operation. The only fighters who participated in Operation Kadesh were trainees of the combat course who were attending the squad commanders' course. They participated in a parachute jump in Mitla, Sinai. The leaders of Flotilla 13 realized that the IDF had difficulty deploying forces in small-scale warfare and maneuvering on land.

Following Operation Kadesh, the IDF decided to boost cooperation with the Air Force and the new Navy submarine unit. Flotilla 13's capabilities were enhanced by the acquisition of advanced equipment, including new Maiale pigs, remotely piloted explosive boats, diving equipment, navigation tools, and radar. In addition, Flotilla 13 resumed operational activities beyond enemy lines.

In March 1958, Flotilla 13 fighters reconnoitered the ports of Tyre and Sidon in Lebanon and Latakia in Syria, using kayaks. In July 1959, Operation Yuval 3 was carried out in Beirut port, but the force was discovered and extracted under fire. These operations restored friction with the enemy and operational learning within Flotilla 13, rekindling the unit’s fighting spirit and hunger for performing missions. 

1960-1969: The Six Day War and the War of Attrition

During this decade, Flotilla 13 participated in the Six Day War and the War of Attrition. During the Six Day War, the Flotilla led five complex operations on all fronts, but finished the war without significant achievements. Following this experience, the unit implemented a thorough process of lessons learned. Its reinforced skills enabled it to lead exceptional operations in the War of Attrition between 1967 and 1973. During this period, the Flotilla enhanced its sea raiding capabilities and quickly became one of the IDF’s leading raid units. The flagship operation of this period was the raid on Green Island during the War of Attrition.

Establishment of a school and defensive diving unit

At the beginning of this decade, Flotilla 13 continued to shape its organizational structure for combat and determined the level of fitness for operations for its commandos. In addition to the three operational units (divers, boats, and Maiale pigs), the leadership decided that the training school would be a separate fourth unit, distinct from the operational units. This led to improvements in the process of selection, sorting, and training of Flotilla 13 commandos. The school organized the recruitment of volunteers for the unit and their training and development into fighters suitable for the various units. The character of the Flotilla 13 fighters was shaped by the instructional staff’s personal example, the training course, internal investigations, and feedback.

At this stage, the combat course lasted about two years, and its graduates were officially certified as combat soldiers, marine raiders, and combat divers. Special emphasis was placed on extending the range of action for the fighters in the field, as well as on the principle of secrecy, so they could infiltrate enemy ports by surprise. New combat methods were developed and weapons were improved.

In early 1963, graduates of Flotilla 13 founded a defensive diving unit as part of the Flotilla. The unit was based in Haifa, and the founders included both commandos and NCOs.

The Six-Day War

In early 1967, the Navy operated in two main theaters, the Mediterranean Sea and the Gulf of Eilat. The vessels of the fleet, and Flotilla 13 in particular, were not yet fully prepared. Most of the vessels were from the World War II era. On the eve of the war, Flotilla 13 consisted of several dozen commandos, a reserve force that also included several dozen commandos, ten explosive boats, twenty rubber boats, and four old midget "Pig" submarines. The Flotilla had operational plans that it had learned and practiced before the war, including landing and attacking enemy ports in the northern and southern theaters. With the outbreak of the war, the Flotilla carried out five attempted attacks along the coasts of Syria and Lebanon in the north, at Egyptian ports in the Nile Delta region, and at the Gulf of Eilat. Each attempt involved several forces from Flotilla 13's combat units.

The first attempt, which included two Flotilla 13 forces as well as Maiale pigs, targeted Syrian enemy ports: the northern force aimed at Mina al-Bayda, while the southern force aimed at Tartus. Two ships were converted from fishing boats to warships with machine guns. They set sail in stormy seas, but encountered technical problems and scheduling issues, and ultimately did not fulfill their missions.

The second attempt was made by the diving unit on the shores of Lebanon. They set out on the Noga with two additional forces. Originally, one was supposed to attack the Baniyas marina, while the other would conduct a landing operation in Latakia port. Following changes in plans while at sea, the two forces combined for the Baniyas operation. The combined forces set out for the attack but encountered an identification problem in the field, and had to return to the collection point and cancel the operation.

In the third attempt, the explosive boats unit planned an ambush of Egyptian destroyers in the Gulf of Eilat near Coral Island, as part of the effort to conquer Sharm El Sheikh. During this operation as well, the forces encountered many difficulties and returned without engaging the enemy.

The fourth attempt was made at the Alexandria port by a force from the divers unit. The force set out on May 25 aboard the Navy submarine Tanin, after conducting a major combat preparation procedure. Complications began from the start when the diving pairs separated, and each diver proceeded alone in the direction of the operation. The port was completely dark, and an Egyptian vessel became involved and caused the submarine to retreat. When the divers surfaced at daylight, Egyptian forces found and captured them, despite rescue attempts.

The Flotilla operated under difficult conditions, using outdated weaponry and with its personnel split into five attack attempts. Each attempt involved several forces, and even during ordinary times, this arrangement would have required long and complex preparation and senior leadership. Undoubtedly, this war highlighted the value of striving for contact. However, in contrast to the decisive victory obtained by the Air Force and ground units, the Flotilla forces returned home without significant achievements. Even more humiliating was the capture of the fighters in Alexandria port, who were held prisoner for eight months before they were finally released.

Lessons from the war

One of the lessons derived from the war was the decision to train Flotilla fighters in all sub-units (boats, Maiale pigs, divers, and instructors) to be versatile fighters capable of adapting to many situations. In addition, the training program was reorganized to commence with land-based skills, including basic training, a command course, and a parachute course. Afterward, the fighters underwent a preparatory naval course, a combat diving course, and an advanced tactical course. The training program lasted about eighteen months, and the selection process was conducted according to the various stages.

This led to a change in the number of fighters and operational norms, allowing the units to divide their time between operational activity and training and force preparation. Emphasis was placed on combat in the form of raids, including covert penetration abilities and field skills – spatial orientation and accurate navigation. The Flotilla’s technological and logistical system also improved, to provide optimal support for the fighters and to transport them within the new borders of the country.

During the Six Day War, France imposed an arms embargo on Israel. As a result, the Flotilla began to cooperate closely with the US military, and this strong collaboration has continued to the present day.

The War of Attrition

The War of Attrition began immediately after the Six Day War, in July 1967, at the borders of Egypt and Jordan, and continued until the ceasefire in August 1970. The fighting began at the height of Flotilla 13's process of learning lessons from the war, aiming to immediately return to significant operational activity. The Six Day War resulted in a new strategic reality for Israel, with multiple maritime borders. This greatly assisted Flotilla 13 in regaining its strength. At first, the unit engaged in small operations, gradually accumulating operational experience, developing combat capabilities, and eventually carrying out land and sea raids. This capability was unique to Flotilla 13 and was highly needed in battle. The unit did not miss any operational activity that would provide it with experience and operational engagement. These operations reflected the changes that the unit underwent – a systematic increase in the scope, type, character, complexity, and frequency of its operational activities, and the improvement and refinement of its professional skills.

Raid on Ras Adabiya

After Flotilla fighters gained experience and capabilities, the leadership decided for the first time to send it on independent land operations via the sea. The target chosen was a radar post on the Adabiya Peninsula in the northwest of the Gulf of Suez. On June 21, 1969, after a long preparation process and a preliminary reconnaissance patrol, twenty-five Flotilla 13 fighters set sail in rubber boats. Their mission was to eliminate enemy forces at the station and destroy it. Shortly after midnight, the fighters disembarked from the boats, about 550 yards (500 m) from the coast. They swam to shore and crawled stealthily until they reached their target.

The force was divided into five teams. Four of these attacked the target, while the fifth unit positioned itself to block the retreat route. With the advantage of complete surprise, Flotilla 13 fighters captured the target and cleared it within forty minutes. They then sabotaged the position's infrastructure and retreated. Twenty-nine Egyptians were killed and the facilities and buildings damaged, while on the Flotilla side, two fighters were lightly wounded. This was a tremendous success for the Flotilla fighters, who combined their sea and land capabilities. This mission also proved to be excellent preparation for future operations.

Raid on Green Island

In July 1969, the Flotilla invaded Green Island in the Gulf of Suez. This mission was a direct continuation of the raid on Ras Abadiya, after the commanders realized that The Flotilla had a relative and qualitative advantage in executing ground raids by sea. Green Island is in the northern part of the Gulf of Suez. An outpost was located on the island, in a built-up area surrounded by defensive walls. About one hundred Egyptian fighters defended the outpost with cannons, radar, mortars, and other means. Additional Egyptian forces stationed there included firepower, boats, and planes. This raid was planned as a preliminary stage in an extensive attack to be conducted by armored forces, which aimed to cross the canal and strike the Egyptians. The intention was to deliver a psychological blow to Egypt and thus strengthen the IDF's deterrence power in that arena.

As in the previous mission, the Flotilla’s goal in this raid was to destroy the enemy and sabotage its facilities. The plan was presented to the General Staff, and the commanders decided that the Flotilla would operate together with Sayeret Matkal fighters. The unit prepared for the operation at the home base in Atlit. The guiding principle behind the operation was surprise, along with maximization of the combined forces’ expertise.

The invasion of Green Island took place on the night between July 19 and 20, 1969. By 8:00 pm, as night fell, the first forces began their operation from Ras Al Masala to the north, along the Gulf of Suez. At 10:45 pm, the covering force reached its destination, a buoy that served as an observation and fire position. The first wave of commandos descended from their boats about half a mile (900 m) from the target and began swimming as a group. As they neared the target, they switched to diving, a technique developed during training for this operation. While underwater, the divers encountered difficulties that slowed their progress and were unable to establish contact with the control center. Finally, at 01:25 am, five minutes before the last possible moment, the divers reached their destination. As they prepared to invade the target, an Egyptian soldier approached. The force opened fire and attacked the outpost with the covering force, which opened massive fire. The Egyptian enemy responded with gunfire and illuminated the sky with flares.

After the firing began, the second force, from Sayeret Matkal, advanced in rubber boats and prepared to clear the fort through the northwestern corner. At 01:55 am, the Sayeret reached the target, passed through the breach, and quickly began clearing the target according to the predetermined plan. The fighting resulted in casualties and fatalities on both sides. At 02:15 am, enemy resistance ceased, and the forces began evacuation and withdrawal to avoid the possibility of being hit by artillery in daylight. During preparations for detonating the fort, shells fell on the force, and they rushed to retreat. A small force remained to detonate the hall and then withdrew. Shortly before 3:00 am, the forces reached Ras Sudr on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, except for one unit of six soldiers, whose boat was damaged. The commandos swam two miles (3.5 km) until they were identified and picked up by Air Force helicopters. At 6:15 am, the last fighter safely reached Ras Sudr.

The mission was accomplished in full, with some seventy-five losses on the Egyptian side. The enemy artillery was damaged, and the infrastructure in the northern part of the outpost was destroyed. On the Israeli side, during the raid, six soldiers were killed, three from the Flotilla and three from Sayeret Matkal, and eleven were injured, ten of them from the Flotilla. Six soldiers were commended for their actions, and all the wounded returned to battle. This was the second consecutive raid operation in which the Flotilla carried out its mission with great success, implementing the value of commitment to the mission. The unit gained operational knowledge and experience, proving its exceptional operational capabilities to the IDF chief of staff and its commanders.

Operation Raviv (Dewdrop)

Despite the casualties and injuries sustained by Flotilla 13 during the raid on Green Island, the unit immediately began preparing for Operation Raviv (Dewdrop) – a large-scale amphibious landing on the western side of the Suez Canal. These preparations included covert coastal reconnaissance (Minor Raviv Operation) to carry out the armored force landing, and operations to sabotage Egyptian torpedo boats patrolling the Gulf of Suez since the raid on Green Island. Neutralization of these boats was an operational prerequisite for executing Operation Raviv. On September 5, 1969, a Flotilla 13 force set out on Maiale pigs for Operation Escort 1, aimed at sabotaging Egyptian torpedo boats in the Gulf. This attempt failed because the boats were patrolling at the time and were not at anchor. The force set out again two days later for Operation Escort 2, again on Maiale pigs. This time, they identified the boats, infiltrated them, and attached limpet mines that destroyed them. During the force's retreat, three soldiers from one of the Maiale pigs were killed as a result of a technical failure and a mine explosion. The fourth soldier in the force heroically extracted the bodies of the soldiers, swimming for six hours until helicopter evacuation. This operation marked the opening salvo for the large-scale armored raid Operation Raviv, in which the IDF raided a forty-three mile (70 km) stretch of the Egyptian coastline along the Suez Canal. In an overt demonstration of the IDF’s power, the Egyptians were taken completely by surprise, resulting in 100-150 Egyptian soldiers and police officers killed.

The War of Attrition continued into the 1970s, and in June 1970, Operation Rooster 25 took place. In this operation, Flotilla 13 commandos crossed the Gulf of Suez and raided an Egyptian guard post located about fifteen miles (25 km) north of Ras Ghareb. The soldiers sneaked in, breached the structure, cleared it, and eventually detonated it. For the first time, the unit used a Snunit boat, which permitted a high level of stealth and a quick withdrawal by helicopter after engaging with the enemy. One Flotilla soldier was injured as a result of a flare grenade, while on the Egyptian side, one soldier was killed and another injured.

In early 1970, diving Unit 707 carried out two offensive raid operations in the Suez Canal, combined with the Shaked Reconnaissance Unit – Operation Sergeant in March and Operation Victoria in June. Following these operations, the IDF recognized and authorized Unit 707 as an independent naval raid and sabotage unit. In Operation Victoria, over twenty Egyptian soldiers were killed, while Israeli forces suffered four fatalities and over ten wounded.

Despite the heavy losses in this war, the Flotilla learned lessons and exploited operational opportunities. It improved operational norms and combat methods, and fully utilized the resources at its disposal, while striving for engagement, flexibility, and creativity. These factors established the unit as one of the best naval and land raid units in the IDF. The Flotilla proved its worth as the only IDF unit capable of penetrating the most challenging targets, using diverse methods such as swimming, diving, and Maiale pigs. 

1970-1979: The Yom Kippur War

The War of Attrition continued in this decade, coming to a climax with the Yom Kippur War. This war proved to be a significant stage in the development of the Flotilla in terms of operations, professional performance, and values. Beyond the Yom Kippur War, the Flotilla focused its efforts on Palestinian terror organizations in Lebanon, which inflicted severe blows on the Israeli home front and Israeli targets abroad. The Yom Kippur War and Flotilla operations in Lebanon greatly influenced the growth and reinforcement of the Flotilla, enabling it to become what it is today.

Building strength

After the conclusion of battles in the Suez Canal in the Egyptian theater, Flotilla 13 entered a phase of learning lessons from the war and focusing on building strength, as befitting a major special operations unit of the IDF. The operational successes brought progress in the development of Flotilla 13's capabilities, and this period was characterized by intensive training. Infiltration methods changed and were adapted to the types of targets, nature of warfare, and means employed, creating versatility in both wartime and inter-war operations. The commanders decided to distinguish between different combat situations: a target within a defended area on the shore, reached by swimming; a heavily fortified stronghold on an island in the sea, infiltrated by diving and land assault in large groups; and active military vessels, reached by diving with the aid of mini subs.

An independent development team was established in the Flotilla, aiming to advance the diverse combat capabilities, support the combat system for the execution of missions, and incorporate new combat assets. The combat assets included Snunit boats designed to serve as assault boats for transporting Flotilla 13 fighters. Additionally, the selection criteria for volunteers to join Flotilla 13 were redefined, and candidates were required to undergo a two-week training course and the traditional march along Israel’s shoreline. In early 1972, the commanders decided to merge the training course and the march for the purpose of the selection process. The change in the training course, reorganization of combat units, and new combat assets sparked interest and motivation among the members of Flotilla 13. These factors also extended the length of service for many commanders and fighters and led to an increased willingness of new volunteers to enlist. As a result, the number of fighters in Flotilla 13 doubled.

The Yom Kippur War

By the time the Yom Kippur War broke out, the unit had built a qualified and battle-ready force, both in regular service and reserves. It had carried out significant offensive operations at sea and on land, and improved its combat capabilities for both naval and ground warfare. After the war began on October 6, 1973, the Flotilla focused on preparations for sabotage operations, including the Brosh Operation on the Syrian coast, the Boker Operation in the Suez Canal, and the Baz Operation in Port Said. At that time, the fighters of Unit 707 attempted, under heavy fire, to extract soldiers trapped at the Wharf Outpost (Mutzav Hamezach), but they were unsuccessful.

The Flotilla 13 soldiers knew that in this war, their primary goal would be to fulfill their missions. With the onset of the war, naval vessels of the Egyptian Navy, originating from Hurghada and Adabiya Ports, attacked Israel Navy boats in the southern sector. The decision was made to deploy a significant force from Flotilla 13 to the Red Sea theater for raids on these ports and to prepare for landing ground forces. The Flotilla prepared for raid operations by sea at a range of about 120 miles (200 km) in each direction. At the time, such a range was considered unrealistic in terms of force readiness. But since a war was on, all involved realized that they would have to take risks to accomplish the mission. In a series of remarkable operations known as Magbit (“Collection”) Operations, the Flotilla made its way through the sea using a variety of methods that were improved during combat, resulting in significant hits to these ports.

Operation Magbit 1 began on October 9. It consisted of divers, and a small force aboard three boats. Due to operational considerations and to maintain the element of surprise, they were recalled, and after documenting lessons learned, immediately reorganized in order to fulfill the mission. A day later, in the afternoon of October 11, Operation Magbit 11 was launched. About 550 yards (500 m) from shore, the divers entered the water and swam until they reached the enemy position, at midnight. Despite the enemy’s use of demolition bombs, the divers attached a limpet mine to a missile boat anchored in the port, causing it to explode and sink in the harbor. The divers then returned to the rubber boats and withdrew from the shore under fire, until they reached the rescue boats that awaited them at sea.

On the night of October 19, the Flotilla fighters set out again for Operation Magbit 15. For the first time, they used Patzchan boats – small Snunit boats converted into attack vessels with a 600 pound (270 kg) explosive charge, similar to the Yochai boats. During the operation, the force identified a missile boat in the harbor and launched a multi-stage attack with two Patzchan boats. Unfortunately, they hit near the missile boat, so the boat suffered only minor damages from shrapnel, but the harbor was severely damaged and destroyed. The force withdrew under fire and returned to their base in Sharm El Sheikh. This operation alarmed the Egyptians in the harbor, prompting them to reinforce its defenses.

The final offensive operation in Hurghada Port, Operation Magbit 16, was carried out on the night between October 21 and 22, just moments before the ceasefire. The Flotilla fighters once again modified their operation method, utilizing American anti-tank missiles they had received a few days earlier. The force embarked on three Snunit boats. As they approached the harbor, the fighters identified a missile boat. The enemy opened fire, but the fighters advanced to within several dozen yards and fired several anti-tank missiles, destroying the enemy boat. They then withdrew to Sharm El Sheikh.

Alongside these operations, the Flotilla conducted preparations for Operation Or Yarok (Green Light) in cooperation with the Navy. This was an amphibious landing operation that required neutralizing Egyptian naval forces in the Red Sea theater. While continuing the offensive operations in Hurghada Port, the Flotilla focused on offensive actions, primarily on Snunit boats, in the security zones of Sharm El Sheikh. On October 10, a force from the Flotilla and Unit 707 embarked on Operation Yetush (Mosquito) using Dabur boats, and then switched to rubber boats. Their objective was to execute an ambush raid along the Suez-Hurghada coastal road, near Abu Daraj. The forces remained in position for several hours, but no vehicles passed by. Intelligence later reported that one vehicle encountered a remaining explosive device.

In coordination with the operations in the Red Sea theater, an additional force from the Flotilla embarked on a Navy tank landing craft on the night between October 16 and 17 for Operation Lady. In this operation, the force conducted a raid on Port Said in the Mediterranean Sea, using two mini-subs, following a target dossier prepared by the Flotilla. In this daring operation, the fighters hit three military vessels in the harbor. However, two fighters were killed in this audacious operation, and remain missing to this day. They were awarded military honors posthumously.

The results of these operations in Egyptian ports in the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea theaters reached beyond the mere destruction of war vessels. They created freedom of movement for landing operations in the Red Sea, and subsequently enabled the blockade of the Egyptian Third Army from the sea. The Flotilla fighters demonstrated determination, courage, and comradeship, embodying their unwavering commitment to the mission. Thus, the Yom Kippur War marked a significant milestone in the history of Flotilla 13, both professionally and for its battle values.

Establishment of the naval guerilla warfare unit

As part of the lessons learned from the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War, an opportunity arose for organizational changes. Following the establishment of the Israel Navy Guerilla Warfare Unit, Flotilla 13 underwent significant transformation and growth. This unit merged Flotilla 13 with Unit 707, which had begun in 1963 as a defense diving unit and later evolved into a naval sabotage unit. The merger allowed for the consolidation of a unified combat doctrine for naval raids, a higher-level command structure, and unified headquarters operations. The merger centralized matters of equipment maintenance, development of capabilities, and weapons. The recruitment, selection, and training of fighters were also maximized with the establishment of a unified training school for both units. All fighters underwent training as elite infantry soldiers and specialized in counterterrorism and amphibious warfare. Upon completing their training, they were divided into specific specialties based on their personal characteristics, resulting in fewer dropouts in each unit.

However, there was significant criticism within the Flotilla regarding the merger. After nine months, in late 1974, the IDF leadership decided to restore the traditional structure of Flotilla 13. Unit 707, the defense divers unit, became a separate unit within the Flotilla, focusing on diving operations. Despite the establishment and subsequent dissolution, the Flotilla greatly benefited from the organizational changes, ranging from selection and training processes to administrative support, development, and the makeup of the combat units.

Warfare in Lebanon

In September 1970 (Black September), a new threat emerged from the Lebanon border, following the expulsion of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) militants from Jordan to Lebanon. They positioned themselves in the Beqaa Valley (known as "PLO Land") in the east and in the refugee camps along the western coastline, and initiated maritime operations. In response to this new threat, Flotilla 13 began offensive operations, including independent and combined raids of various sizes, sea and coastal ambushes, and targeting naval vessels.

Pre-Yom Kippur War

Raids

The period leading up to the Yom Kippur War included the Bardas (Hood) raids, which mainly targeted terrorists and aimed to destroy their bases and capture or kill them. This period also included the Aviv Neurim (Spring of Youth) operation.

In February 1973, Operation Bardas 54-55 was carried out. This was a long-range combined raid (180 kilometers from the border) on the headquarters of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp (Bardas 54) and the Nahr al-Beddawi refugee camp (Bardas 55), near the Syrian border. The guiding principle behind this operation was the element of surprise – in timing, location, and method. After a short and intensive preparation phase, fighters from Flotilla 13 and Unit 707 embarked on a missile ship and rubber boats. They landed on the shore and attacked the targets. The forces eliminated three terrorists, including a Turkish commando guide, and destroyed the buildings in five terrorist bases. Four Israeli fighters were injured by friendly mortar fire during the operation. This daring operation surprised the terrorists, Arab countries, and the entire world, introducing a new dimension to the IDF's fight against terrorist organizations.

In Operation Aviv Neurim, in April 1973, special forces from Sayeret Matkal, the paratroopers brigade, Unit 707, and Flotilla 13 participated. They attacked several PLO targets in Beirut and the Sidon area. The operation involved five forces that raided five different targets, including two land targets of Flotilla 13. Unit 707 fighters joined the infantry forces in raiding the other targets. About one hundred fighters from Flotilla 13 participated in the operation, with half of them in the assault team, and around seventy fighters from Unit 707. The forces reached several Lebanese shores on Navy missile ships. Dozens of rubber boats transported them to the beach, where they were met by Mossad agents.

Two forces of Flotilla fighters raided weapons manufacturing facilities and a command headquarters. They infiltrated by sea, landed on the beach and attacked two targets in Beirut. During the raid, they killed terrorists, located weapons production machinery, confiscated documents and weapons. Ultimately, they destroyed the targets without casualties to the Flotilla force. In this operation, three senior PLO members were killed when they were caught off guard in their homes, shocking the organization. Additionally, around twenty PLO terrorists were eliminated, as well as Lebanese security personnel and an Italian civilian. The Israeli force lost two soldiers.

The success of the large-scale combined operations, Bardas 55-54 and Aviv Neurim, became a classic example of combined IDF operations against terrorist organizations, placing The Flotilla on the operational map alongside the elite units of the IDF.

Post-Yom Kippur War

The period following the Yom Kippur War saw a significant increase in terrorist attacks by sea, attempting to bypass Israeli navy security primarily in the Lebanese arena. These actions included taking hostages and mass murder attacks. Infiltrations by sea also aimed to carry out attacks in Israel, such as the attack on the Nahariya beach, the attack on the Savoy hotel in Tel Aviv, and the hijacking of an Air France plane to Entebbe in Uganda. In light of this, the Flotilla operations focused on the Lebanese arena. Their fighters sank vessels, carried out ambushes at sea and along the coastline, and continued independent and combined raids.

Damage to vessels

To prevent infiltration operations from Lebanon, the naval commandos sank numerous vessels used by terrorists at Lebanese marinas. Most of these operations were called Tr'uat Gil (Cry of Joy) and Darshan (Preacher). The fighters, mainly divers, used Snunit boats and rubber boats, and booby-trapped the enemy vessels. The relatively high number of operations and constant readiness enabled smooth execution using a short combat preparation procedure.

Land ambushes

Towards the end of the decade, the Flotilla carried out land ambushes along the coastline. Most of these were called Mohar (Dowry) Operations. Their goal was to intercept terrorist vehicles, damage and destroy them, causing the terrorists to retreat and pushing them into their camps. The Flotilla commandos struck many terrorists using this method, limiting their freedom of movement and creating a feeling of pursuit. The Flotilla also carried out coastal ambushes, including a warning force and a strike force, as part of other operations, and this became a commonly used tactic within the force.

Raids

The Flotilla carried out numerous raids of varying extent, some in combination with ground and air forces. In July 1975, the Flotilla participated in Operation Onat Katzir (Harvest Season) 20, a joint operation with infantry and paratrooper officers in the Kasmiya sector. About eighty fighters participated in this operation, following a thorough preparation process. The forces set sail on missile boats and raided at night using rubber boats. After ninety minutes of progress, the fighters attacked multiple targets simultaneously, with fire support. A jeep carrying four terrorists was destroyed, and six buildings used by terrorists were blown up. There were no casualties on the Israeli side. Although a higher number of terrorists was expected, the operation was considered a success.

Following this, the commando unit continued independent operations until Operation Litani in March 1978. The independent operations included Onat Katzir (Harvest Season) 21 A and B and Bar Mazal (Lucky). Many terrorists were killed and their infrastructure and weapons destroyed, all without losses to our forces.

Operation Litani

Following the Coastal Road Massacre in March 1978, in which thirty-eight Israelis were murdered and seventy-six wounded by PLO terrorists, Israel launched Operation Litani in southern Lebanon. The operation lasted a week, aiming to gain control of terrorist targets there. During this operation, the IDF took control of southern Lebanon from the slopes of Mount Hermon in the southern part of the “PLO-Land" area to the Litani River. As part of the operation, the Flotilla carried out two land ambushes with two units in a strike-warning ambush (Operation Avei Hachochma [Fathers of Wisdom]) on the coast north of Tyre, north of the area where the IDF ground forces were operating. Their goal was to prevent the retreat of terrorists from the combat zone to the north or the flow of support forces from the north to the south. In one encounter, two terrorist leaders were killed, including the chairman of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), known as Jihad Carlos.

Operation Fall Leaves

After this operation, the Flotilla continued to strike the enemy in Lebanon. In June 1978, the fighters embarked on Operation Shalechet (Fall Leaves), a raid from the sea in conjunction with the 35th Brigade. The objective was to attack terrorist targets south of the Zaharani River. This area had served a base for maritime sabotage units that carried out the attack on the Savoy Hotel (March 5, 1975) and the Coastal Road Massacre (March 11, 1978). After a rapid combat preparation procedure, they sailed on missile boats and landed on the coast, where they were joined by paratroopers. Following a complex inland movement, the commandos destroyed their target. They then assisted in rescuing a paratrooper unit in distress after the building in which they were operating collapsed with them inside. The commando force secured the area and evacuated the paratroopers by sea to the missile boats waiting offshore. The forces completed the mission successfully. Seven terrorist buildings and at least six rubber boats and speedboats were destroyed, while some twenty terrorists were killed, and several others were injured. However, the paratrooper force suffered two fatalities and eight wounded.

The decade ends: Enhancing strength

At this stage, Flotilla 13 refined its operational concept in accordance with contemporary threats, extending its range of operations and multi-branch cooperation. The first priority was to strike enemy ports to achieve maritime superiority for the Israeli navy, followed by raids on strategic targets, destruction of vessels, and support for landing ground forces via the sea. To fulfill these missions, the Flotilla underwent significant organizational changes, trained fighters, and upgraded combat means. A fighting company was established, and professional domains were defined for combat units, based on their emergency missions. One unit was defined as a raiding unit, while a second unit focused on diving, including underwater vessels. In addition, a reserve fighters’ company was established with over ten teams. Furthermore, the command decided that Unit 707, the professional defensive diving and deep-water unit, would split from Flotilla 13 and become an independent unit called Yaltam (Underwater Missions Unit). This change was implemented in the early 1980s.

The commando unit made changes in the training process according to its doctrine and defined the required skills, including sea and air infiltration capabilities, guerilla warfare, and support for the landing of ground forces on enemy shores. The unit switched to recruiting two cycles per year. According to the new training structure, basic infantry training was carried out first, followed by a parachuting course, infantry squad commander’s course, a preparation course and a basic course, followed by an advanced course. The training course was built in stages so that in a wartime situation, the force could be optimally deployed based on its capabilities, and the fighters would at least be trained as infantrymen. Weapons were adapted to the units’ needs, and new weapons were integrated. Zaharon boats were purchased and replaced the Snunit boats, Mulit fiberglass-bottomed boats replaced the rubber boats, and Rozen boats replaced all types of Maiale pigs. 

1980-1989: The Lebanon War

During this decade, the intense fighting in Lebanon that had begun in the early 1970s continued, with all the classic operations of Flotilla 13 – independent and combined raids, attacks on vessels, and ambushes. In addition, the commando unit led the largest landing operation in the history of the IDF during the Peace for the Galilee (First Lebanon) War. This decade marked a turning point for the unit in terms of the pace and regularity of operations in hostile territory, at sea and on land. Operations were conducted initially against Palestinian terror, and later against the growing Hezbollah organization. In addition to these operations, during this decade the Flotilla assisted in the airlift of Ethiopian Jews through Sudan. This became a source of pride for the unit, as it was a national operation of paramount importance.

Medals of Valor

After a break in operational activities from August 1979-April 1980, Flotilla 13 returned to its operational routine beyond enemy lines. Initially, it was used to prevent the infiltration of terrorists through the sea, and later, to push back and neutralize the terrorists’ coastal and maritime infrastructure up to Beirut, in preparation for Operation Oranim, known today as Operation Peace for the Galilee or the First Lebanon War.

Raids

During this decade, the unit carried out many raids, including Operation Metach Gavohah (High Voltage) in April 1980 – a raid on the terrorist headquarters of the PFLP under the command of Ahmad Jibril in Ras al-Shaq. In terms of scope, this was the largest operation of the unit during the period preceding the First Lebanon War. The raiding force consisted of about forty fighters, who landed on the beach from Snunit boats and rubber boats. The fighters then split into six forces, simultaneously attacking secondary targets, and destroyed the enemies and their infrastructure. Eighteen terrorists were killed in the attack, including three who were on their way to carry out an attack, and many others were injured. Two Flotilla fighters were lightly wounded. The results of the raid were good and matched the excellent performance on the ground. In addition, in March 1981, a Flotilla 13 force set out on Operation Kohen Kadosh (Holy High Priest). Over thirty fighters went on a raid to mine glider landing strips in the Tyre area, which terrorists used to carry out an attack in the Krayot suburbs of Haifa. As the forces advanced toward the glider landing strips, the northern force encountered terrorists and hit eight of them, killing at least two. The southern force mined the landing strips as planned.

Ambushes

In addition to the raids, Flotilla 13 carried out a series of land ambushes on the coast of Lebanon, aimed at destroying terrorists. These included the Operation Pachmei Even (Coal) series, Operation Aliya Bedarga (Promotion), and Operation Se’arat Hurikan (Hurricane) 1. The forces numbered from sixteen to fifty fighters per operation, and they were transported by Snunit boats or Maiale pigs, covered by missile boats. They positioned themselves in coastal ambushes and killed numerous terrorists. Furthermore, the unit carried out combined offensive ambush operations with the Air Force, including Operation Arba Imahot (Four Mothers) and Operation Pas Lavan (White Stripe), destroying the enemy with the support of attack helicopters. Moreover, after a long period without sabotage operations on vessels, Flotilla 13 forces carried out a series of Operation Darshan (Preacher) in the Tyre port and Sidon areas. The forces moved on Snunit boats, deployed divers with תעלולנים[JS1] , attached mines to the ships, and destroyed them.

These operations led to the improvement of the fighters' precision and strengthened cooperation with the Air Force and with Navy units. During this period, Flotilla 13 received its first Medal of Valor from the IDF’s eleventh Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan for "displaying courage, composure, and resourcefulness."

The First Lebanon War

Terrorist activity in Lebanon continued to intensify. The terrorists shot Katyusha rockets towards northern Israeli settlements, infiltrated Israeli territory, and attacked on Israeli diplomats. On June 2, 1982, terrorists shot and severely wounded the Israeli ambassador to Britain. In response, Israeli Air Force planes attacked terrorist bases in Lebanon, and on June 6, the First Lebanon War, also known as Operation Peace for Galilee, began. It ended on September 1, 1982, with the withdrawal of terrorist and Syrian forces from Beirut.

Landing on the Awali River delta

The Oranim Plan detailed the Israeli Navy’s missions: land large forces in the Awali River area, carry out land-based ambushes, assist forces in crossing water obstacles, prevent the escape of terrorists by sea, and evacuate injured Israeli personnel by sea. In preparation, the Israeli Navy and Flotilla 13 brought together naval vessels for sea landings and for training their forces. For the Flotilla, this training included all the components that were later carried out during the war. During April 1982, Flotilla 13 conducted a series of four coastal inspection operations, all called Operation Had Gisa (On One Hand). During these operations, the force examined the beaches of Al-Awali and Zaharani, which were later used for landing during the war.

On the night of June 6-7, 1982, Flotilla 13 participated in securing the coast and landing tank landing craft of the 96th Division and the 35th Brigade on the Awali River delta, and in outflanking enemy formations by sea. About one hundred naval vessels participated in the landing operation, making it the largest landing operation in IDF history. In the combined operation, Israeli Navy ships isolated the area, while combat aircraft and helicopters destroyed enemy targets, and Sa'ar helicopters assisted in medical evacuations.

After loading the forces at the Ashdod base, they sailed north. At noon, the command decided to land on the Awali coast instead of the Zaharani coast, as the Flotilla fighters had recommended during preliminary coastal inspections. Under cover of darkness, the Flotilla's coastal security force arrived in rubber boats to the immersion point, which they had identified during previous reconnaissance missions. They then swam to the shore following the sandbars and set up the security units.

The landing of infantry forces at the Awali River delta took place after the IDF had already entered Lebanon, so there was an expectation of some resistance from terrorists waiting for the sea landing. After light enemy resistance, which included peripheral shooting from light weapons, and after encountering two terrorist vehicles that were quickly neutralized, paratrooper security forces began to land in rubber boats to bolster defense in the landing area. Towards midnight, the tank landing craft arrived with the maneuvering forces. The Flotilla's operations on this first night of the landing played a crucial part in the achievements of the campaign against the PLO in southern Lebanon.

Land and sea ambushes

During the First Lebanon War, Flotilla 13 carried out three ambush operations along the coastal road in Lebanon. Operation Speedo 10 took place simultaneously with the landing operation in Awali on the night of June 6-7. About sixty fighters from Flotilla 13 set up two vehicle ambushes on the coastal road, north of the landing area in Ras Saadiyat and Nabi Younes, to isolate the landing area from the north. During these ambushes, Israeli forces did not encounter the enemy.

On the night of July 29-30, the Flotilla set out for Operation Speedo 20, on the coastal road north of Tripoli. This time the force consisted of only sixteen fighters, who arrived in Zaharon boats and a Mulit, protected by Navy missile boats. The force engaged three terrorist vehicles and retreated to the mother ship, with four fighters lightly wounded.

Finally, in September, Operation Marsa 2 took place, south of Tripoli, with twenty fighters from Flotilla 13 who were transported by Zaharon boats and a Mulit, with the assistance of missile boats. While moving to the ambush preparation point, the force encountered an enemy patrol. It engaged two vehicles, eliminated nine terrorists, and retreated to the sea with no injuries.

As part of the IDF's operations to occupy the city of Beirut in late July 1982, Flotilla 13 carried out two attacks on terrorist targets in Beirut beach hotels. In these operations (Shelet Neon [Neon Sign] 5 and 6), the commando unit attacked enemy targets after a force stormed the hotels, while an observation and gunfire support team that remained on the Zaharon boat directed fire from Navy boats towards the targets. The force destroyed the target and eliminated several terrorists. In addition, three composite operations were carried out in July and August. In these operations as well, Flotilla 13 provided observation and guidance, enabling Navy missile boats to actively engage terrorist targets.

The First Lebanon War resulted in a more robust Flotilla 13. The force led the preparations and execution of the largest landing operation in the history of the IDF. To this day, landing capabilities remain one of the Flotilla’s fundamental skills. The forces were integrated into IDF missions to maximum effect, with the war marking a turning point in Flotilla 13's integration into ground combat.

Fighting in the Security Zone in Lebanon

After the First Lebanon War, Lebanon remained the IDF’s main battlefield. Israeli soldiers continued to stay in Lebanon until they gradually withdrew to the Blue Line. In 1985, they were deployed in the Security Zone. As in the past, Flotilla 13 focused its activities on sea and land ambushes, attacking vessels, taking control of terrorist ships in mid-ocean to capture weapons, and attacking the enemy. In addition, dozens of operations were carried out for observation and intelligence gathering, in preparation for future operational activity.

Maritime and land ambushes

The ambush method in the Security Zone grew significantly in scope during this period. It was diverse, both in the means of combat and in modes cooperation with the Navy and Air Force. For example, in June 1983, in Operation Am Oved (Working People) south of Tripoli, a Flotilla force adopted innovative tactics: it transported to the area by submarine, raided the coast in Mulit and Zaharon boats, placed Tirosh roadside charges on the road by night, and then returned to the submarine. As a result of their operation, two vehicles were damaged, and two senior Syrian officers and seven soldiers were killed. In Operation Hamat Gader (Border Hot Springs) 2, combat helicopters guided by Flotilla fighters conducted a sea ambush, attacking four terrorist targets north of Tripoli on the coast of Lebanon.

On the night between September 13-14, 1983, Flotilla 13 fired rockets at terrorist targets north of Tripoli, in Operation Hakla’a (Marksmanship). About six months later, in June 1984, a Flotilla force implemented Operation Shaletet (Ruler) 2, a raid on the island of Jazeerat a-Nahl near Tripoli, after receiving intelligence about terrorist activity there. The Air Force attacked the site, but the command decided that the Flotilla would also attack with a Snunit boat, weapons, and fire support from a missile boat. In doing so, they destroyed a boat that tried to evacuate terrorists from the island, and eighteen terrorists were killed.

In addition, in August 1984, Flotilla fighters on Snunit boats assisted Lahatut attack helicopters and missile boats by directing fire and observation. The helicopters fired six missiles at the terrorists' boat house, and after the terrorists returned to the target, the missile boats were blown up. In late 1984, the Flotilla returned to operate in the Beirut sector, following an intelligence warning about a bombing planned in West Beirut. The force conducted aggressive patrols using Snunit, Zaharon, and Mulit boats, under cover of Navy boats. In these operations, known as Metichat Panim (Facelift), they destroyed the terrorists' boats and thwarted their activities.

In July 1987, a Flotilla force initiated a land ambush called Hatzav Adin (Delicate Squill), against terrorist vehicles south of Sidon. The operation involved combat helicopters for lighting and attacking targets, and boats for observation and direction from the sea. When the forces arrived at the coast, while advancing to the ambush point, the force attacked two terrorist vehicles using grenade launchers and rockets. One vehicle was destroyed, and the other was damaged. The force eliminated seven terrorists, and four others were injured. Israeli forces suffered no casualties. Also in 1988, in the Pore’a Hov (Repay Debt) operations in southern Lebanon, a Flotilla Snunit boat guided a Navy Dabur boat.

Sinking operations

Flotilla fighters sank many boats during this period. In July 1983, a force from the Flotilla used Zaharon boats in Operation Carbolet Aduma (Red Coxcomb). The fighters dived to the Al-Mina marina north of Tripoli and sank the terrorist boat Saudri. In addition, in Operation Degel Lavan (White Flag) 1 in December 1983, Flotilla fighters sank the terrorist boat Ouda at anchor on the main pier of Tripoli port. Immediately afterward, two Snunit-Tehila boats planted four sea mines to disrupt activity in the port. While planting the mines, Flotilla fighters reported that a large quantity of weaponry and ammunition were on the pier. This prompted the missile boat to open fire, hitting another boat anchored near the pier.

In April 1985, Operation Mukeh Sanverim (Snow Blind) was carried out. After searching for over six months, a team of Flotilla divers sank the terrorist ship Moonlight in the port of Annaba, Algeria. Terrorists had intended to use this ship for a hostage attack against Israelis. The operation was unique due to the long distance, complex timing, and the secrecy required, and it was executed with great success. After a hurried combat preparation procedure, the forces set sail for a three-day journey. Challenging sea conditions forced them to move slowly. As they approached the port of Annaba, the Mulit and Snunit boats were lowered into the sea, carrying the team, and then the divers descended in Ta’alulan vessels[JS2]  to rig the boat with explosives. The divers immediately identified the ship and rigged it with a delay mechanism. The forces then returned to the missile boat. After a few days, the mines exploded as planned, and the ship sank.

In 1988, the First Intifada began, and many terrorists were expelled from Israel. Some tried to return to Israel by boat, hoping to garner international public opinion. To thwart this intent, the Israeli Navy and Flotilla 13, in cooperation with the Mossad, located the ferry Sol Phryne and planned to prevent it from reaching Israel. To this end, Operation Shidurei Hutz (External Broadcast) was carried out in February 1988, aiming to sabotage the ship in Limassol port in Cyprus, with the help of divers. The operation included Ta’alul boats, Snunit boats, and Mulit boats, transported on Navy missile boats. Two explosive devices were attached to the ferry, creating a large hole and preventing it from sailing. In a different operation implemented at the same time, Flotilla fighters assisted the Mossad in the Limassol region.

 Another operation intended to deter terrorist capabilities and damage the terrorist axis between Sidon and Cyprus was Operation Bareket (Emerald) in June 1989. In this operation, divers deployed on three Zaharon boats secured by a missile boat. The divers reached the port of Sidon, identified the vessel, and attached mines to terrorist ships. Three ships were damaged and decommissioned. The mission was carried out smoothly and at a high professional level. Two months later, in August 1988, Operation Hofshonit (Mini-Vacation) was carried out, in which a diving force commandeered the Bassem Bay, a merchant ship, with the help of Ta’alulan, Snunit, and Zaharon boats, and supported by missile boats and a naval patrol. The operation was successful.

Seizure of vessels

The seizure of vessels suspected of aiding terrorists also became routine. During this period, the Navy seized about ten vessels. The Navy developed a protocol for seizing vessels: based on intelligence alerts, it dispatched missile boats carrying Flotilla 13 commandos, for search and seizure operations. Some were brought to Haifa port, while others were released after search and interrogation. Many of the operations took place in the Cyprus and Tripoli regions. Terrorists and numerous weapons were found on many of the vessels.

Operation Blue and Brown

After the IDF's withdrawal to the security strip, Hezbollah's strength grew, and it became the dominant force in southern Lebanon. Palestinian terrorist organizations also continued their attempts to infiltrate Israel. In April 1988, a terrorist base was identified in Nueimah, and the Air Force attacked it. Despite the attack, the underground bunkers, buildings, anti-aircraft fire positions, and caves remained intact. Following a series of attacks against Israel in December 1988, the command decided to carry out Operation Kachol Vechum (Blue and Brown). Combined IDF forces – sea, land, and air – participated under the direction of Special Operations Command. They raided the target and destroyed it. The purpose of the operation was to kill terrorists and destroy equipment and weapons, with the long-term aim of disrupting and preventing malicious activity in Israeli territory.

About a month prior to this operation, Operation Rav Teder (Multiple Frequency) was carried out to gather the needed intelligence for Blue and Brown. During this operation, Flotilla commandos surveyed the landing beach and the route to the target.

The Blue and Brown operation included more than ten different forces – sea, air, and land. The attacking forces were divided into four secondary forces from the Flotilla, Givati Brigade, and Battalion 12. The forces set out from Atlit and Haifa bases on missile ships, and towards evening, they lowered the commando boats with a force to secure the coast. After dark, the fighters swam for ninety minutes until they reached the shore. Upon arrival, they secured the beach and received the invasion forces. At midnight, the Flotilla force split from the Golani force. When they received their firing order, the Flotilla force stormed the target, eliminated the terrorists, and then fired grenades and rockets at the headquarters building to destroy it. Meanwhile, Golani forces also attacked the target. Some Israeli soldiers were injured, including the commander of Battalion 12. The command decided to urgently evacuate them by helicopter, despite enemy fire, the approaching dawn, and the threat of enemy reinforcements arriving. During the evacuation, Flotilla fighters evacuated some of the forces by sea, in the same manner as they had arrived. During the operation, over twenty terrorists were eliminated, including one senior terrorist. Israeli forces suffered one fatality and three wounded. The forces demonstrated the ability to reach any target and operate in it, thereby deterring the enemy.

Operation Show of Purpose

In 1988, Operation Hatzagat Tachlit (Show of Purpose) was implemented, aiming to eliminate Khalil al-Wazir, also known as Abu Jihad. The PLO’s second in command, he was responsible for the murder of dozens of Israelis, including the 1975 attack at the Savoy Hotel, the Coastal Road Massacre in 1978, and an attempt to bomb the Kirya central military base in Tel Aviv in 1985. After the First Intifada began, Abu Jihad played a key role in exploiting the popular uprising in Judea and Samaria, and Israel marked him as a key target.

In this operation, Flotilla fighters transported the Sayeret Matkal commandos in Snunit and Mulit boats. They secured the coast and then landed the force on the beach. From there, the Sayeret commandos traveled to the target in vehicles arranged by the Mossad. After they eliminated the Abu Jihad’s driver and personal security guard, the force broke into his home and eliminated him in his bedroom. Within minutes, the force returned to the evacuation point on the beach. After waiting for the Mossad fighters, the Flotilla evacuated the force to the sea before dawn.

Operations to bring Ethiopian Jews to Israel

Beyond its defensive missions, the Flotilla participated in a national operation that expressed Israel’s values and also required the capabilities of a covert naval unit – bringing Ethiopian Jews to Israel. In the early 1980s, following a deterioration in the situation of Ethiopian Jewry and unsuccessful diplomatic attempts to bring them to the country, the Israeli government decided on a covert operation to bring them to Israel. After many months of preparation, in the summer of 1980, the rescue operation began. In collaboration with the Mossad, the Flotilla fighters, including some reservists, took over an abandoned Italian resort village named Arous, and prepared it to serve as a forward base for organizing the illegal immigration. At Arous, they carried out Operation Merom Harim (Mountain Peaks), going on dives and cruises to gather intelligence, map the coastline, and formulate an operational plan.

The first operation, Operation Hagdara Atzmit (Self-Definition), began in November 1981. The Ethiopian Jews walked to the refugee camps, then were transported covertly by truck to the "resort village." There the Flotilla fighters loaded the group onto rubber boats that took them to the mother ship, Bat Galim. This ship had been refurbished and converted into a merchant ship flying a Panama flag. It carried the immigrants through the Gulf of Eilat to Sharm El-Sheikh, and from there they were flown to central Israel. In this way, about a thousand immigrants arrived in about ten airlifts. Later some six thousand immigrants were brought by sea, until September 1984.

This operation proved the IDF's ability to operate at long distances, and strengthened the force’s initiative, and creativity as well as its value of dedication to fulfilling the mission. 

1990-1999: Combat in the Security Zone – Comradeship

This decade witnessed a significant shift in the Flotilla’s activity, as it was integrated into ground forces operations. The combination of activity in Lebanon against the Palestinian and Hezbollah enemies, combat during the First Intifada in built-up, crowded areas, and the integration of Flotilla commanders in the ground forces enabled it to become a special force on land. Throughout this decade, the Flotilla significantly enhanced its infantry capabilities, implementing ground operations deep within enemy territory.

In 1997, a major tragedy occurred in Operation Shirat Hatzaftzafa (Whistle’s Tweet). After this operation, the Flotilla focused on refining the structure and organization of its units, and on teambuilding as a fundamental pillar of combat, as is done in elite infantry units.

Strengthening infantry readiness

In this decade, the Flotilla underwent a substantial change. Instead of operating in and from the sea, the Flotilla focused on implementing activities and operations that were entirely ground-based, at the expense of its unique maritime commando capabilities. The Flotilla brought these capabilities and relative advantages to bear in the various land combat arenas in which the IDF operated.

Integration into land operations

As the decade began, the Flotilla joined combat operations during the First Intifada in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. The Flotilla also gained experience in fighting in the Lebanon security zone, and this also helped lead to its transformation into a special ground force. The Flotilla led numerous operations in land combat sectors, including belly ambushes, sniper ambushes, observations, concealment of charges, expertise in camouflage, and more. The Flotilla became an expert in ground combat drills and techniques, and the fighting spirit of its soldiers prevailed when they participated in the IDF's combat effort.

Commanders on the ground

Although several commanders were integrated into the ground army prior to 1990, but it was during this decade that encouraging officers to command infantry units became an integral part of the development path for senior commanders. Flotilla commanders deployed to regional brigades in Judea and Samaria, and commanded select units - Egoz, Samson, and Duvdevan, as well as the Nahal reconnaissance unit, Golani reconnaissance unit, and Givati reconnaissance unit. The deployment of the commanders to command special forces units improved their level within the unit and significantly improved the unit's capabilities in ground capabilities. The naval commando received experienced officers with broad horizons, and the units benefited from excellent commanders who strengthened their first line of command.

Transition to specialization in the training course

The Commando Course is the central factor that shapes the commando’s persona in the unit, transforming fresh IDF recruits into fighters in Israel’s navy commando force. In the 1990s, the Flotilla decided to change the structure of the training course. This decision came after years of headquarters staff work on the topic, in the understanding that changing times demanded adjustments to create a better training course. The training course requires professional specialization, as opposed to general knowledge and at the expense of versatility – "Each individual knows so much more about so much less.”

Due to the need to increase the number of fighters, the decision was made to reduce the training course dropout rate by establishing a high-quality, homogenous selection process, from the preliminary stage to the final preparatory stage. This would ensure that no shortcomings in the fighters’ qualifications would appear at later stages. After the selection process was completed,  course commanders were instructed to focus on training instead of selection. The duration of the program remained eighty-two weeks. The change focused on content and perception of training. The command decided that the training would be comprehensive and aim for the lowest common denominator among combat units, while emphasizing specialization according to areas of combat. Special emphasis was placed on basic skills in shooting, combat fitness, and operational norms throughout the training, and not only in the infantry stage. The basic level command course (sergeants’ course) was canceled, and instead, drills and exercises led by the trainees were introduced, emphasizing the importance of responsibility and command in front-line operational tasks.

From individual fighter to an organic combat team

At the end of the decade, another significant change was made in the structure of the Flotilla, from incorporating individual fighters into combat teams based on the mission, to organic combat teams. This change came after the accumulated experience of this decade. One of its goals was for each team to fulfill its tasks fully, in routine maneuvers, combat operations, and emergencies, while acting as a unified operational force. This step brought the Flotilla closer to ground combat units, such as the elite commando units (Sayarot). This development also led to a fundamental change in the perception of how Sayeret fighters and teams should be trained and operated. It affected the nature and structure of the training track, the development of officer and command tracks, and enabled optimal operation in combat, as teamwork abilities were improved. The organic nature of teams covered gaps in the force. The ability to operate in relatively large forces improved drastically, particularly considering the frequent changes in mission and the need for constant readiness and availability. In practice, each trainee was identified for placement in a combat team with a specific operational purpose, and trained accordingly. After completing the unit's basic training, which gave fighters the relevant values and professional principles, each team underwent professional training for its specific operational purpose.

The First Intifada

The First Intifada was a popular uprising of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank that began in December 1987. Palestinians held strikes, caused violent disturbances, and committed acts of terror, with the goal of undermining Israeli rule and establishing a foundation for an independent Palestinian administration. In response, the IDF was charged with restoring order, combating terror, and restoring a normal way of life for all of Israel’s populations. To do so, the IDF set up regional and specialized units for combating terror, some under the command of Flotilla commandos, and the regular operations of the navy and air force were intensified.

The naval commandos' operations in the First Intifada began in the late 1980s. Their missions aimed to isolate the eastern sector in the Dead Sea area to prevent the entry of foreign elements into Judea and Samaria, and patrols to enforce fishing laws on the Gaza coast. In 1991, Flotilla commandos increased participation in battles together with ground forces, mainly in the Jenin and Tulkarm sectors. In 1992, after suppression of the First Intifada, the Flotilla continued to participate in ground operations to capture wanted terrorists in Judea and Samaria. The commandos operated in these sectors in complex environments that challenged them beyond their usual operational experience. Later in the decade, this combat enabled many commanders to become part of ground units, leading to significant changes in the IDF’s perception of the Flotilla.

Combat in Lebanon in the ‘90s

At the beginning of the decade, Flotilla commandos mainly carried out covert operations to gather intelligence on the shores of Lebanon and maritime ambushes to locate and destroy the enemy. They also participated in rescue and offensive operations. In 1991, two raid and sinking operations were implemented. In Operation Sho’ev Avak (Vacuum) in October 1991, Flotilla divers arrived on Zaharon boats to Sidon marina. After a short combat procedure, they mined and sunk a terrorist boat. In December of that year, in Operation Shafan Sla’im (Rock Hyrax) took place, commandos in Mulit and Zaharon boats raided Al-Arub villa near Ras al-Ain, and bombed it with an explosive that caused it to collapse.

In the second half of 1992, the Flotilla's offensive activity noticeably increased. Operations focused on northern Lebanon, near Tripoli, after the command realized that significant terrorist activity was taking place there. During a covert patrol in August as part of Operation Zvi Habar (Wild Gazelle), the commando unit encountered four terrorists performing a swimming exercise, and killed them. After several more patrols, in late October 1992, Operation Bizman Emet (Real Time) took place. Commandos attacked two targets in the area, following a long and meticulous preparation process. In this combined raid, missile boats bombed from the sea, while a force raided using Rozen, Zaharon, Mulit, and Snunit boats. The operation involved many capabilities that the Flotilla had developed over time, diverse weapons, firing from the sea, and division into four secondary forces. The result of the combined operation was successful, and the targets and the terrorists were destroyed.

In early 1993, the Flotilla continued to neutralize the enemy in this region. In Operation Kfitzat Madrega (Moving up a Notch), a raiding force attacked a terrorist base, with the assistance of missile boats and attack helicopters. Flotilla fighters placed charges on the target, helicopters fired missiles at specified targets, and missile boats shelled the coast. Buildings, training boats, and terrorists were hit.

Operation Din Veheshbon (Accountability) and Operation Invei Za’am (Grapes of Wrath)

Hezbollah intensified its activity, firing mortar shells on the northern settlements and attacking IDF forces in the security strip. This escalation led the IDF to prepare for a wide-scale operation in southern Lebanon. In July 1993, the IDF launched Operation Accountability, in which they attacked Hezbollah and other terrorist organization targets, from the northern end of the security zone up to the Zaharani River.

During the operation, the Flotilla carried out four operations. In one, a raid called Operation Bina Malachutit (Artificial Intelligence), they overpowered a Palestinian terrorist target, after it was attacked from the air. The operation was carried out with fire support from missile boats. One vehicle was destroyed, two terrorists were killed and others were injured, but civilians were also injured, probably in the air force attack. In addition to the raid, there were two patrols and an ambush with Zaharon boats to locate and destroy terrorists. These ended without results. After this operation, the IDF increased its offensive activity in Lebanon in order to maintain the achievements of this operation. The firepower effort from land, air, and sea was significant and very effective. The Flotilla focused on carrying out dozens of raid operations from the coast, covert collection operations, inserting and extracting agents, sinking enemy vessels, and sea and land ambushes, in cooperation with the navy and air force.

In October 1993, during Operation Electro-Opti (Electro-Optic), the Sayeret sabotaged three fishing boats at the Mizra’at Hizrin dock, using Zaharon and Mulit boats and divers who attached mines, after the enemy boats were involved in an attempted attack on Israel’s coast. During a covert patrol as part of Operation Besorah Me’anyenet (Interesting Tidings) north of Tripoli, the force encountered terrorists near the target and hit three of them.

Operation Grapes of Wrath took place after the Flotilla had acquired extensive knowledge of the Lebanese terrain and experience in raiding and landing from the sea, following the many operations carried out previously in Lebanon. Applying the lessons learned from Operation Accountability, this time the command decided to organize into two forces under company commanders, with dozens of fighters in each force. Although many daring operations were planned between Tyre and Beirut, aimed at harming terrorists using the Flotilla’s familiar combat methods, the unit's activity focused on vehicle ambushes and sweeps in the coastal sector, where they did not encounter any enemies.

Operation Shirat Hatzaftzefah (Whistle’s Tweet)

Despite the understandings reached in Operation Grapes of Wrath, Hezbollah continued its activity against IDF forces in the security strip, inflicting many casualties. The operational successes of Hezbollah undermined the IDF's deterrent power. In 1997, three severe incidents occurred during regular IDF activity that caused many casualties to the IDF. The first was the helicopter accident, in which seventy-three fighters were killed; the second was the fire incident in which five IDF soldiers were killed; and the last was Operation Whistle’s Tweet, in which eleven Flotilla fighters and one rescue team member were killed. This operation was part of the IDF's daring offensive activity deep in enemy territory, intended to place the enemy on the defensive and shift the battlefield to its territory.

Operation Whistle’s Tweet took place in September 1997. The force’s mission was to plant charges targeting a senior figure in the Amal terror organization, near Ansariyah in southern Lebanon. This mission was a continuation of another operation carried out a month earlier in the same area, by the Golani Reconnaissance Unit. Like many operations at that time, a lengthy and meticulous combat preparation procedure was conducted, following training with all forces and participants.

The force consisted of sixteen fighters. They were ferried by missile boats, and then advanced to the coast in rubber boats and by swimming, and continued from there on foot. At midnight, while they advanced, the entire main force was hit by several roadside bombs. The force returned fire toward suspects. The explosion separated the forward force, which was not injured, from the main force. After a few seconds, a second explosion went off, and as a result, four fighters from the forward force were injured. At this point, the force reported the incident and requested evacuation. The rescue force was airlifted in helicopters, accompanied by attack helicopters. Then a third explosion hit the main force, severely injuring the fighters. While the evacuation force landed in a Yasur helicopter, vehicles arrived in the area, and in the exchange of fire, the evacuation force doctor was killed. The force began to gather the injured and treat them, and the extent of the disaster was revealed.

The rescue and evacuation helicopter landed a second time, but evacuating the numerous wounded under fire was complex and challenging. After a long time on the ground, the helicopter took off with two fighters still missing. Despite the pressure for a quick evacuation, the rescue team continued its brave, loyal search for the missing, with only six fighters supported by combat helicopters. During the search, the body of another fighter was found. After the Chief of Staff ordered to evacuate before dawn, another helicopter landed and evacuated the force to Israeli territory. The body of another fighter remained in enemy territory until June 1998, when it was returned to Israel in a prisoner exchange deal, along with body parts of additional soldiers who were killed in the operation.

This was a bold operation that ended with devastating consequences for the IDF in general, and for the Flotilla in particular. All forces operated with extraordinary courage and brotherhood. The operation results and the inquiry committee that investigated the failure of this operation proved to be significant milestones in the way the Flotilla was run. They marked a major change in the public’s trust in the IDF, and led to the organizational changes in the unit made in 1999. 

2000-2010: Battling Palestinian Terror and the Second Lebanon War

For the Flotilla, the first decade of the twenty-first century was diverse in terms of operational activity, both at sea and on the ground. Due to the sensitive nature of these activities, we cannot provide much detail about this period. The Flotilla began this decade with activities in Judea and Samaria, as part of the Second Intifada (also called Iru’ei Ge’ut Ve’shefel, “High and Low Tide Events,” or the Al-Aqsa Intifada), and culminated in Operation Homat Magen (Defensive Shield) in the city of Jenin. Subsequently, the unit operated deep inside enemy territory in the Second Lebanon War in 2006 against Hezbollah.

After the war, the unit's activity primarily focused on what was known as the “Interwar Campaign,” mainly against Iranian presence in the area and their attempts to assist terror organizations with weapons, knowledge, and undermining Israel’s legitimacy and resilience. The main operations involved raids, commandeering vessels, and maritime ambushes. In addition, the Flotilla continued to participate in IDF operations against terror organizations in the Gaza Strip.

Building the Flotilla in the early 2000s

The unit's activity in the early 2000s was centered on a change in operational philosophy and strengthening the force. Following the lessons learned from Operation Toot of the Whistle, the Flotilla transitioned to a team model. The unit’s combat course was updated, with a major emphasis on building the team of fighters who worked together in various scenarios, in covert operations and in warfare.

Like other special units, the Flotilla often participated in special operations against Palestinian terror, due to a shared interest of the units and the regional commands. The units sought to maintain operational tension and a level of readiness, and primarily to take part in the IDF’s main mission at that time. Simultaneously, the various commands enjoyed high-quality personnel, advanced professional capabilities, and deterrence created thanks to complex operations deep inside Palestinian territory. As part of this process, cooperation between these units and the Israeli Security Agency (Shin Bet) also improved.

During this decade of warfare, the unit developed a system of kinetic ambushes, using the Spike missile, an electro-optical missile with a range of about five kilometers (3 miles). In these ambushes, a force from the unit specialized in weaponry would remain in position until reliable intelligence information was received from the Shin Bet. Upon receiving the information, the force would attack the target and neutralize the terrorists. In addition, the unit developed a unique arrest method, which included receiving intelligence information while moving on targets, in cooperation with Mobile Unit 5515. This method relied on the mental abilities of the commanders and the fighters, who were prepared to change the mission, mode of operation, and location of the operation, in real time. This mode of operation included large body of forces, involving an entire company of fighters, who moved on foot or by vehicle movements to close potential movement paths and escape routes of top terror organization leaders and terrorists. As soon as the forces arrived at the target based on the intelligence, they implemented a surround procedure until the suspect was flushed out. This mode of operation was mainly implemented at night, but sometimes had to be performed during the day, and it led to many exchanges of fire between the unit's forces and terrorists. In addition, the unit adopted a central platform which proved to be a game-changer in operational activity and technological capabilities.

When the latest round in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict broke out in 2000, the Flotilla was ready with commanders who had extensive experience in ground combat against enemy terrorist activity, at various ranks and levels. This was a product of the experience they had acquired during active participation in the fighting in the First Intifada and in Lebanon. The officers in the unit’s key positions had experience in commanding other units, and they were well versed in the theory of warfare, the drills, and combat techniques. Just as importantly, they had deep knowledge of the various battlefields and their characteristics, as well as the different commanders.

The Second Intifada

The Second Intifada began in September 2000 and lasted until late 2004. The IDF's activity against terrorist organizations focused on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and was characterized by a high level of conflict with the civilian population. Terrorist organizations carried out numerous attacks against Israeli citizens, which led the IDF to expand its operations in the West Bank and Gaza, aiming to put a stop to brutal terrorist activity. The terrorist organizations operated asymmetrically at the levels of tactics and public awareness, creating a new challenging space for the IDF and driving it to make the prevention of terrorist attacks a central objective.

One of the Flotilla’s strengths is its ability to operate swiftly in various terrains, both at sea and on land, recognizing that the unit must contribute to the IDF wherever and whenever needed. The Flotilla decided to join the IDF's offensive effort in Judea and Samaria and Gaza. At the beginning of the conflict, teams specializing in land operations were active, and subsequently, all unit commanders and soldiers joined the operations. The unit carried out many operations, including special operations in Judea and Samaria, such as arrests and the elimination of terrorist cells and terror organization leaders, to prevent them from carrying out additional attacks against Israeli citizens. For this purpose, the unit developed independent operational capabilities, and in cooperation with IDF units, the Ministry of Defense, and the Shin Bet, based on precise intelligence and the ability to carry out focused attacks against terror organization activists and their leaders, from far and near ranges. In doing so, they eliminated Hamas and PFLP leaders in Judea and Samaria and Gaza.

Seizure of the Karine A weapons ship, 2002

In addition to land activity, the Flotilla continued special operations in the maritime theater. One example is Operation Teivat Noah (Noah's Ark), in which fighters took control of the Karine A weapons ship in January 2002. This was a strategic operation that exposed the true intentions of the terrorist organizations and their leaders. On one hand, they claimed to be pursuing peace, while on the other, they were preparing for an escalation. Thanks to international cooperation and joint intelligence operations with the US, intelligence information emerged regarding a cargo ship named Karine A, which the Iranians were using to transport weapons from Iran to the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and Syria by sea. The Iranians loaded about fifty tons of weapons at the port of Kish in Iran, and the ship set sail towards its Middle East destination in December 2001. The Flotilla received a warning about the ship, and prepared for a takeover while the ship was sailing in the Red Sea, before it could reach the Suez Canal and proceed to the Mediterranean Sea.

The unit's forces prepared for a complex and intense combat procedure within a short time frame. Once ready, they traveled to the southern sector, to the Naval base in Eilat. The forces boarded Navy ships and Air Force helicopters. In January 2002, Karine A sailed between Saudi Arabia and Sudan, over 500 km (310 miles) from the State of Israel’s border in Eilat, under the flag of the Kingdom of Tonga. About fifty commanders and fighters sailed on Morena and Zaharon boats. In addition, combat forces from the unit arrived in helicopters. They sailed in the Red Sea in complete stealth and challenging sea conditions. After verifying the ship’s identity, approval was received for the seizure. In the early morning, the unit's fighters secretly advanced on fast boats and took over the ship with the help of the helicopter force. In just seven minutes, the takeover of the ship was completed.

A search of the ship’s hold revealed some fifty tons of weaponry on its way to the Palestinian Authority: over four hundred rockets, seven hundred mortars, seven hundred bombs of various models, sniper weapons, anti-tank missiles, RPGs, hundreds of mines, and Kalashnikovs. The unit sent the code word "sweets" to the command center in Israel, confirming the findings. After taking control and locating the weapons, the ship sailed to the port of Eilat under the Israeli flag. There it was met by the media, which exposed the efforts of Iran and the Palestinian Authority to smuggle in weapons by sea. The attempt failed thanks to many factors in the IDF and beyond, but especially due to the work of the unit's commanders and fighters. They completed one of the most complex and daring operations in the history of the unit, with some fighters sailing on Morena boats in difficult sea conditions, including a storm. Throughout, they maintained the highest levels of secrecy. This mission had valuable strategic consequences for the State of Israel’s security.

Operation to sink vessels in Gaza

Following Operation Noah's Ark, the Flotilla embarked on an operation to sink vessels in Gaza port, based on information gathered during interrogations of the Karine A ship's crew. The unit's forces arrived stealthily on Zaharon and Morena boats, and after surveying the target, they began the diving and assault phase. The diving force arrived secretly at Gaza port, alongside the assault force. At the entrance to the port, the forces split. The diving force continued towards the Jindallah, whose commander had been the captain of the Karine A. The divers attached mines to the target and broke contact in a covert dive, while the assault force placed charges on the Gaza guard ship, and broke contact. After the force left the area, the mines were activated and both ships were damaged and neutralized. The operation sent a message of deterrence to terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, aiming to thwart and prevent weapons smuggling by sea.

Operation Tuned Note

In February 2002, Palestinian police officers carried out a shooting attack at the Ein Arik checkpoint, killing six IDF soldiers. In response, the IDF command decided to carry out Operation Zlil Mechuvan (Tuned Note). In this offensive operation, Flotilla fighters attacked Yasser Arafat's presidential villa in the Gaza Strip, located near the coastline and secured by the Palestinian Force 17 presidential security unit. The Flotilla force arrived via sea and began swimming towards the shore, under the guard of unit forces on boats.

Upon reaching the shore, the assault force entered an ambush under the cover of rocks on the shore. After identifying enemy armed forces within short range, the fighters coordinated a volley of fire using silenced sniper weapons and eliminated all the terrorists. Next, the force shot at the searchlights in the compound, and executed a quick retreat to the sea. While swimming westward to the boats, enemy forces accumulated in the villa compound and opened fire from shore towards the fighters. The force responded from the sea by firing a kinetic missile fire at the shore and destroyed a vessel belonging to naval forces of Gaza terror organizations. The combined elements of surprise, secrecy, and timing ended in a successful hit on Force 17 in the heart of the terrorist organization's stronghold in Gaza, creating deterrence.

Operation Homat Magen (Defensive Shield)

Following a series of terrorist attacks, in particular the horrific attack at the Park Hotel in Netanya in March 2002, the IDF launched an offensive operation, aiming to defeat terrorist organizations in the heart of Palestinian cities. One of the significant events of this operation was the battle in Jenin refugee camp, which lasted about ten days. Terrorists from various organizations prepared for stubborn warfare in the camp, setting explosives, blocking access routes to the camp, and exploiting their advantages in combat in built-up and dense areas. The battle at the refugee camp involved regular and reserve forces from infantry, engineering, and armored units, with Flotilla 13 serving as a special operations force.

Initially, the Flotilla force consisted of three regular combat teams, to which additional reserve combat teams were added as the battle progressed. The Flotilla led the 5th reserves brigade into battle on the night of April 3. Progress was slow, and they reached the launch point in daylight, under extensive fire from the terrorists. The brigade entered the edge of the built-up area, and camped there throughout the day. The following night, they launched a simultaneous attack from multiple directions, during which two Flotilla fighters were injured.

Later, on the morning of April 9, a reserve force encountered an ambush in the refugee camp. Terrorists attacked the force by detonating an explosive and shooting from the roofs into the battle area. While evacuating the injured, the forces witnessed terrorists abducting bodies from the site. A force from the Flotilla quickly parachuted in, broke into the building, and retrieved the bodies of the fighters. Thirteen reserve soldiers were killed in the battle.

Following this event, the IDF entered with multiple engineering forces, aiming to defeat the terrorists. Their activity resulted in the elimination of dozens of terrorists, including senior leaders in the camp. The forces also demolished numerous buildings suspected of being booby-trapped or hiding terrorists. These actions led the terrorists to surrender on April 12. Twenty-three soldiers were killed, and dozens were wounded during the battles in Jenin.

This operation underscored the offensive initiative and the integration of Flotilla forces into ground combat in any mission, sector, and opportunity, to assist the IDF in achieving its objectives. The unit's regular and reserve forces operated with determination and professionalism in the continuing battle against terrorists in dense urban areas, proving itself a central force in the operation. Recognizing the unit's activities during this period across all combat sectors against terrorist organizations, as well as its demonstrated initiative, in 2002 the IDF decided to award the unit with the Chief of Staff Medal of Valor, the second in its history. In this the IDF expressed its deep appreciation for the unit, which had excelled in extensive operations across all fronts.

The Second Lebanon War, 2006

Before the Second Lebanon War began in the summer of 2006, escalation started in Gaza. This followed a period of relative calm after Israel left the strip in the summer of 2005, as part of the disengagement plan. The escalation included rocket fire into Israeli territory. At the end of June 2006, terrorists from the Gaza Strip infiltrated Israeli territory through a tunnel, and attacked a position and a tank near the Sufa and Kerem Shalom crossings. In this attack, two IDF soldiers were killed, and one soldier was captured alive by the terrorists. On the same day, a pre-military academy student in the Ramallah area was also kidnapped and murdered. As a result, the IDF launched an arrest operation in Judea and Samaria, and in parallel, began Operation Gishmei Kayitz (Summer Rains) and ground entry the Gaza Strip, attempting to locate the captured soldier. The operation lasted five months, and included naval raids by the Flotilla, which exploited its relative advantages in the maritime space.

During Operation Summer Rains, while the IDF was concentrating its offensive efforts in the Gaza Strip, two IDF reserve soldiers were kidnapped on the northern border. On July 12, 2006, three more were killed in by Hezbollah terrorists during a patrol along the border fence. Following this event, the IDF launched a series of operations known as Mivtza’ei Shinui Kivun (Change of Direction Operations). These operations expanded into a war on the northern border between the State of Israel and Hezbollah. The IDF reserves, and the Flotilla in particular, were mobilized for long-term warfare. During the Second Lebanon War, the Flotilla performed many missions, including supporting fire, observation from the sea of forces operating on land. The unit also conducted maritime ambushes to attack targets and objectives, including positions and launchers, thus preventing the enemy from firing at Israel. In addition, the unit carried out operations deep inside Lebanese territory, as well as sea raids, in which its unique abilities and relative advantages came into play.

One of the central operations Flotilla 13 carried out during the Second Lebanon War was Operation Ya’ar Hanegev (Negev Forest) in the city of Tyre, aiming to locate and capture a senior Hezbollah member and bring him to Israel. In this sea raid operation, led by the Flotilla in early August 2006, over ninety commanders and soldiers participated, both regular and reserves.

After preparing for the operation, the forces set sail on their vessels. Around midnight, Flotilla forces raided the shores of Tyre and began moving towards their targets. Despite delays and misidentification of the target, the soldiers continued the operation to accomplish their mission. The entry door at the location was open, avoiding the need for a forcible entry. At the beginning of the battle, they encountered an armed man, whose screams alerted those in the building. The force continued the attack, and during exchanges of fire with the terrorists inside, several soldiers were injured. The soldiers eliminated the terrorists. Due to the exchange of fire, a fire broke out inside the building, complicating the soldiers' retreat.

The Flotilla forces retreated to the sea while evacuating the wounded in a complex operation. The forces performed complicated medical procedures and life-saving measures in the field. Attack helicopters and fighter jets assisted the Flotilla soldiers in retreating, providing fire coverage in the retreat region and bombing power lines to darken the area and help the force to reatreat safely. Due to the medical condition of the wounded, the command decided to land transport helicopters in the area under fire, and from there they returned to Israeli territory.

This operation resulted in the elimination of about ten terrorists, including operators of Hezbollah's long-range rocket system. Eight Flotilla soldiers were injured at varying degrees of severity, and although the target was not captured, the aggressive raid at the heart of the Hezbollah stronghold prevented further rocket fire from the Tyre area.

Transition to two companies, 2010  - מעבר לשתי פלגות , 2010

In addition to the extensive operational activity, the Flotilla made an organizational change. The traditional company split into two: one company specialized in combat on over-water vessels and sea attacks, while the second company specialized in raids, combat, and tactical diving. The purpose of this change, implemented in the seventh decade of the Flotilla’s history, was to enable it to carry out operational activity at a higher capacity and quality than in the past, during the Interwar Campaign and following the integration of new and complex naval platforms. During this period, the unit continued to engage in operational activity in various sectors and in urgent operations, under the code name Operation Ruchot Shamayim (Winds of Heaven). Some of these operations were part of the IDF and Navy efforts to stop the protest flotillas to the Gaza Strip.

Strengthening the diving unit  -  חיזוק יחידת הצלילה

Together with Flotilla 13’s extensive operational activity, a force-building process took place aimed at raising readiness, combining the fighters of Flotilla 13 with an emphasis on the divers unit. This included developing modernized exercises and combat means that integrate advanced diving equipment with undersea operational capabilities.

This ability has increased the IDF’s operational flexibility in both remote and nearby theaters. Complex operational activities can be performed covertly, rapidly, with varying missions, and with both short and long combat preparation procedures. Collaboration between these units has evolved over the years, exemplifying operational integration in the Navy and enabling boundary-breaking in operational sectors. This capability complemented the integration of an array of advanced diving devices, offensive combat means, and platforms for small-scale combat for transporting divers in both underwater and above-water environments, which advanced the operational capabilities of Flotilla 13.

Above-water platforms - פלטפורמות מעל המים

Force-building during this period included the integration of innovative above-water platforms with advanced command and control capabilities, as well as weapon systems that supported the unit in various operational sectors. Integrating these platforms in the unit's activity went hand in hand with a change in the philosophy of the training course. This was in response to the growing need for fighters capable of operating complex systems with advanced technology, covertly and in close proximity to enemy coasts, far from Israel’s borders. In addition to integration of these systems, the command decided to phase out the Zaharon boats, which had served Flotilla 13 for decades as a small above-water combat vessel, transporting the unit's fighters far from the borders of the state.

2010-2020: The Interwar Campaign – Excellence

Flotilla 13 regularly engaged in covert and clandestine operations, and at the inception of the Interwar Campaign, it led Navy operations, and the IDF in general, in the maritime domain and near-shore environments, across all battlefronts. The unit did this independently as well as in collaboration with other naval units, the IDF, and security agencies, carrying out a broad range of operational activities. It demonstrated boldness and operational initiative in both short and long combat procedures. The unit’s operations in the past decade as part of the Interwar Campaign reflected its uniqueness and relative advantages, and they expressed the IDF's concept of operating offensive forces in the Interwar Campaign. In parallel, Flotilla 13 made significant progress in force-building and integrating technology in above-water, underwater, and terrestrial platforms, alongside changes in the organizational structure, aiming to enable more activity at maximum quality.

The unit carried out diverse operational activities above water, underwater, and on land, expressing its capabilities on battlefronts close to Israel’s borders and far away. Many operations that were carried out as part of the Interwar Campaign – through diving, raiding, or other maritime operations – cannot be described in detail, but the unit's achievements were demonstrated in the field and denied Israel's enemies many capabilities, while maintaining stealth and full mission compliance.

From 2010 to 2019, Flotilla 13 received significant recognition for its work, including four Medals of Valor from several Chiefs of Staff.

Maritime seizures - התקפים ימיים

As part of the Interwar Campaign operations, Flotilla 13 operated as part of the Naval Task Force to prevent the entry and departure of protest ships into the Gaza Strip. These activities required creative operational ideas, along with cooperation with naval forces, at far distances and near Israel’s territorial waters.

Seizure of the Francop Arms Ship

As part of the Iranian effort to transfer weapons to terrorist organizations on the borders of the State of Israel and their aim to establish a base in the Middle East, maritime smuggling efforts continued from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. In complex operations far from Israel’s shores, Flotilla 13 was able to covertly obstruct and neutralize the Iranian effort to transfer weapons from sea to shore in small fishing boats. Consequently, Iranian attempts to transfer weapons in cargo ships increased. When intelligence information was received that verified the Iranians' intentions to transfer weapons to Hezbollah terrorist organization in Lebanon on the Francop cargo ship, the Navy and the Flotilla 13 prepared to stop it in Operation Arba’at Haminim (Four Species).

In the port of Damietta in Egypt, the Francop was loaded with containers full of weapons intended for terrorist organizations, which had arrived on another ship from Iran. The Francop then set sail for Syria to deliver its cargo. In November 2009, after an effort to locate the ship, conditions were ripe to stop it, and naval forces and Flotilla 13 set out for the ambush point. Missile boats sailed towards the ship and ordered it to halt. After questioning over communications devices, according to Navy protocol, the command decided that Flotilla forces would board to locate the weapons. The unit's forces found the weapons and led the ship to Ashdod port. The ship held about five hundred tons of weapons in over thirty containers. The findings included hundreds of thousands of Kalashnikov bullets, tens of thousands of fragmentation grenades, thousands of shells, mortar bombs, Katyushas, and hundreds of rockets. All of these were intended for Hezbollah with the aim of harming the State of Israel, thus attesting to the importance of the operation and its success.

For achievements during this period, in 2010 the Flotilla was awarded two Medals of Valor from then Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi – the third and fourth Medals of Valor in the Flotilla’s history.

Seizure of the Mavi Marmara

Iran's efforts and those of terrorist organizations to send advanced weapons to the Gaza Strip and the northern region continued. The organizers often sent the weapons on sea vessels disguised as “protest boats” carrying “humanitarian aid,” in a campaign to defraud the international media. Flotilla 13 operated in the marine environment to stop these ships, in numerous operations and both long and short battle procedures, demonstrating operational efficiency in the effort to prevent the weapons deliveries.

One of the operations for which the unit prepared was Operation Ruchot Shamayim 7 (Sea Breeze 7). The goal of this operation was to stop a group of six ships organized as a protest flotilla. The ships had left the coast of Turkey and had hundreds of passengers on them, some of whom were terrorists and terror supporters. When the ships refused to halt their course to Gaza, the command decided that the Navy, and Flotilla 13 in particular, would lead takeover operations to stop them. The operation included commanders and soldiers in regular service and in reserves, who were tasked with carrying out a takeover in the middle of the sea, far from Israel’s shores, from the sea and air.

The operation took place in late May 2010, about 190 km (118 miles) west of the coast of Israel, at night and with coordinated timing among all forces. The soldiers quickly took control of five out of the six ships and stopped them. The takeover of the largest ship, Mavi Marmara, was complex. The unit's speed boats carried the soldiers close to the ship. As the terrorists created complex conditions for climbing from the sea, the command decided to slide the soldiers down from the air. After the soldiers slid onto the upper deck of the ship, the terrorists onboard initiated a violent confrontation. Flotilla soldiers had to identify the terrorists among the civilian crowd. Acting bravely and calmly, the soldiers prevented deterioration. They located and neutralized the terrorists among the hostile crowd.

The takeover was carried out in several stages, and in the end, the ship was stopped. Despite the crowd's hostile actions, the unit's commanders and soldiers tended to the needs of the people on board, until the vessel arrived at Ashdod port. During the event, several of the soldiers were injured to varying degrees in their courageous actions. After the operation was completed, news was received that the ship Rachel Corrie, which had been unable to join the six ships that were captured, was on its way to the Gaza Strip. Flotilla 13 forces and the Navy quickly overcame it, with no unusual incidents.

Seizure of the Victoria Arms Ship

In March 2011, the unit took control at sea of the cargo ship Victoria. This vessel was smuggling weapons from Iran disguised as civilian goods passing through Turkey and Syria, with the intention of transferring them to the Hamas terror organization in the Gaza Strip. The ship loaded the weapons at Latakia port in Syria, and added an additional load at Mersin port in Turkey. It then began its voyage to El-Arish port in Egypt. To prevent the ship from reaching its destination and delivering the weapons, the unit prepared for Operation Hok Barzel (Iron Law). In March 2011, Flotilla 13 forces, with the assistance of naval forces, took control of the cargo ship. On it they found over fifty tons of Iranian weapons, including shore-to-sea missiles, radar systems, missile launchers, various types of ammunition, and mortars. The weapons were sealed with operating instructions, with the official signature of the Revolutionary Guards in Iran.

The takeover of the Iranian weapons ship Klos-C

In March 2014, Flotilla 13 led the Navy on Operation Hasifah Mle’ah (Full Disclosure) aimed at seizing control of the weapons ship Klos-C, which had sailed from Iran intending to transfer weaponry to the Gaza Strip. To prepare for the operation, the unit carried out meticulous planning and prepared for various scenarios, including capturing the ship at different geographical points and using a variety of tactics, with the assistance of Navy and Air Force units. The unit's forces included regular and reserve commanders and fighters, as well as missile boats, helicopters, and aircraft for locating the ship in the open sea. In addition, a comprehensive intelligence and communication effort was made to expose Iran's intentions.

The weapons ship began its journey after loading the weaponry at the Bandar Abbas port in Iran. From there, it sailed to the Umm al-Qasr port in Iraq, to load containers that contained additional weaponry. While sailing, operational intelligence was accumulated, and the unit prepared for takeover in the Red Sea area, far from the shores of Israel. In February, Klos-C began sailing towards Port Sudan, and Navy forces, led by Flotilla 13, prepared to reach the optimal takeover point.

After tracking the ship precisely while it was sailing off the coasts of Sudan and Eritrea, about 930 miles (1,500 km) south of Israel’s shores, conditions matured for stopping the ship. On March 5, 2014, in the early hours of the morning, the unit's vessels led the fighters to the boarding points on the ship, which had about seventeen crew members on board. The fighters boarded, encountering no resistance. They then began a highly professional process of locating the containers with the weaponry, among the many containers that were on the ship. The commanders and fighters succeeded in locating the containers, revealing the weapons that Iran had attempted to secretly transfer to the Gaza Strip in order to harm Israel. Among other things, the fighters found long-range rockets capable of reaching distances of over 60 miles (100 km).

Flotilla operations in the Gaza Strip

Operation Cast Lead, 2008 - מבצע עופרת יצוקה, 2008

In late 2008, following rocket fire from the Gaza Strip into the Israeli home front, the IDF launched an initiative aiming to damage Hamas. The operation's objectives were to create lasting calm, prevent Hamas from armament, and rescue an IDF soldier held by them. The operation began during the Hanukkah holiday. Over twenty-two days, Flotilla 13 carried out sea-based attacks to eliminate Gaza terrorists and destroy weapon stores, launchers, and buildings used by terrorists. In addition, the unit conducted sea-based raids, to use the advantage of its relative superiority and surprise the terrorist organization in the Gaza Strip. In addition, the unit fought alongside ground forces that entered Gaza, located terrorists, and eliminated them, working with the Air Force as well.

Elimination of the Hamas Diving Unit, 2010  -  חיסול יחידת הצלילה של חמאס, 2010

In March 2010, Israeli intelligence agencies began to accumulate intelligence regarding a diving unit in Iran trained for combat diving. These were the seeds of the naval commando force in the Gaza Strip. Initially, an attempt to destroy them was made by the Air Force, but the attack was canceled due to weather conditions. Subsequently, the command decided to deploy Flotilla 13 to eliminate the terrorists, in Operation Mefake’ach Hamezonot (Food Inspector). The Flotilla unit sneaked close to the coast on two Morena boats, in a stormy sea. The fighters waited for the diving unit for eight hours at sea, until they received confirmation regarding identification of the terrorists on the coast. The Air Force identified the divers entering with combat equipment, and the green light was given for the attack. The Morena boats rushed towards the terrorists, navigating through the complex watercraft area of the Gaza Strip. The force arrived near the terrorists and launched a timed, massive fire attack while moving, eliminating all the terrorists. Less than three minutes after receiving permission for the attack, the force was retreating at high speed. This prevented a terrorist attack on Israeli territory.

Operation Pillar of Cloud, 2012 - מבצע עמוד ענן, 2012

Operation Amud Annan (Pillar of Cloud) took place in November 2012. It began with the elimination of the Hamas senior military wing by the Air Force. For a week, Flotilla 13 led the Navy’s offense against terrorist organization targets in the Gaza Strip, damaging various systems and eliminating activists, launching positions, and targets.

Operation Protective Edge, 2014 - מבצע צוק איתן, 2014

In June 2014, Hamas terrorists kidnapped and murdered three students in Gush Etzion. Flotilla 13 joined the search effort in the cities of Judea and Samaria. The pressure on Hamas in Judea and Samaria led to a security escalation in the Gaza Strip as well. As a result, in July 2014, the IDF embarked on Operation Zuk Eitan (Protective Edge), which lasted two months. The main threat was the Hamas offensive tunnel system. Flotilla 13 actively participated in the offensive and defensive effort. It acted as an independent special task force, in partnership with the Navy, ground forces, and the Ministry of Defense, in both maritime and ground sectors.

Throughout Operation Protective Edge, Flotilla 13 carried out maritime raids to locate short and long-range missile launchers of Gaza terrorist organizations and destroy them. In the battles, the unit’s commanders and fighters acted as a special task force that performed urgent operations, under the command of forces maneuvering on land. They assisted in the offensive effort from the sea, before and during land maneuvers, until the fighting ended. During these operations, the unit's regular and reserve forces attained operational achievements - neutralizing and thwarting launching positions and terrorists, while using the unit's platforms on land and at sea, above and below water.

In July, in Operation Hod Vehadar (Majesty and Splendor), Flotilla fighters raided a terrorist compound from which terrorists were firing at the Israeli home front in the northern Gaza Strip. Large forces of fighters infiltrated from the sea and advanced under the cover of night to the compound. During the raid, the forces exchanged fire with the terrorists at sites along the coast. The terrorists were killed, while four of the unit's fighters were wounded. This operation had implications for awareness regarding continuation of the battle against terrorist organizations in the Strip, which were surprised by the unit's raid.

Additional operations in Gaza – מבצעים  נוספות בעזה

In addition to the extensive activity in the West Bank, Flotilla 13 acted as a special task force in the rounds of fighting in the Gaza Strip, in November 2018, March 2019, and May 2019, as well as in Operation Hagura Shechora (Black Belt) in November 2019. The fighters also carried out many attacks from the sea against terrorist organization targets in the Strip. In addition, the unit actively participated in the effort to defend the southern settlements and Israel's borders, neutralizing the capabilities of Hamas's special naval forces in the Gaza Strip.

The unit's activity, apart from the rounds of fighting in Gaza, included continuous assistance to IDF forces at the Gaza Strip fence. The unit's commanders and fighters carried out dozens of actions to assist the IDF in its mission and bring the unit's special operational experience to the complex battlefield. Additionally, many maritime arrests were carried out, with Flotilla 13 forces assisting the Navy in preventing fishing boats along the coast from smuggling to the Gaza Strip.

Strengthening the force  - חיזוק הכוח

In the process of strengthening the force in recent years, and following extensive work at headquarters, the command decided to implement an updated headquarters work plan for training the unit’s fighters. According to this plan, the training course takes place once a year, with the training teams advancing simultaneously in all unit professions. The training for combat diving was reinstated for all fighters in the unit. This plan implements organizational and operational lessons learned, both from the team model set in place in the late 90s and from the previous training model. In the updated plan, each warrior has a professional base in raiding, operating and commanding vessels, close combat, and combat diving. 

2020-2023: Flotilla 13 Today and Facing the Future – Readiness and Willingness

From the beginning of its eighth decade, the unit has been engaged in utilizing and integrating technological advantages in the battlefield and in the organizational structure of the unit, in a groundbreaking process in the Navy and the IDF focusing on present and future challenges. This will enable innovative and diverse operational activity, anywhere and at any time.

Today more than ever, the unit operates as part of joint organizational and operational collaborations in the IDF and outside it, to produce a response to challenges in the various fields of operation. These collaborations also take place with Israel's strategic partners and with the unit's counterparts in other countries. The operational foreign relations, including building and operating a joint force, produce a robust international operational partnership in which joint learning processes take place between the countries. This activity has resulted in the expansion of the ranges of operational action.

Alongside the operational activity, the unit assisted in coping with the global coronavirus pandemic, which changed reality in many areas of action, including the IDF and operational activity. The unit acted to assist in national coping efforts, while continuing operations in the different sectors of activity. During this period, Flotilla 13 acted as an operational task force as well as a special task force in dealing with the pandemic and maintaining national resilience.

The unit provided technological solutions and assistance in national strategic thinking processes to cope with the pandemic and assist different populations. During the pandemic, the unit continued its central effort in the Interwar Campaign, to prevent the strengthening of the Iranian presence in Syria, through extensive offensive activity within Israel's borders and beyond.

In 2021, Flotilla 13 was awarded its seventh Chief of Staff Medals of Valor for clandestine offensive activity, both groundbreaking and extensive, in the Interwar Campaign. At the time of this volume's publication, the unit was poised to receive its eighth Medal of Valor from the IDF Chief of Staff. This recognition, acknowledging the unit's activities in the Interwar Campaign, was set to be presented by Lt. Gen. Hertzi Halevi in 2023.

Today the unit continues to serve as a special task force for IDF special operations, as part of the Interwar Campaign. It operates independently and in partnership with the Navy, the IDF, and security entities, within the borders of Israel and beyond. Flotilla 13 continues to operate across a range of scenarios, leveraging its comparative advantage as Israel's naval commando unit –above and below the water, in every location it is asked to reach and in every mission it is asked to perform.

As described in this album, the unit's unique fighting spirit is a common denominator among its regular and reserve personnel. This ethos has allowed the unit to successfully meet the sea of challenges it has faced since its establishment and throughout its history. Flotilla 13 continues to uphold the fighting spirit that was instilled by its founders and continues to reign in Atlit Bay to this day.

 CREDITS:

Project manager - Lt. Gen. (Res.) Guy Zilberbach

Production and editing - Sigal Elkayam

Content writing - Lt. Gen. Aryeh Blot

Consultants and assistant writers - Captain T., Brig. Gen. (Res.) A., Brig. Gen. R., Brig. Gen. (Res.) Beni Spanier

Photography - Ziv Koren

Additional photographs - Israel Navy Archives, Gadi Kabalo, Israel Defense Forces Archives, Palmach Museum

Graphic design - Eden Mugeni

Hebrew editing - Nurit Shai

English translation - Jessica Setbon

Thank you to all the Flotilla commanders and commandos, past and present, and to the Flotilla 13 Center for Learning and Heritage, for sharing photographs and information.

shayetet 13 recommendations:

The books that inspire them (from 2021)

A Shayetet 13 Commander Discusses Three War Films (from 2020)